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ABSTRACT
A structural analysis of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and 
the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) explores the 
organizational dynamics of such social movement organizations (SMOs) and 
contributes to the generalizability of a core species concept of 
organizations. Kreps' core species concept of organization and Gamson's 
previous research on protest groups provide the underpinnings for this 
focus on SMOs as instances of organization. Kreps specifies four 
elements --domains (D), tasks (T), resources (R), and activities 
(A)--which are individually necessary and collectively sufficient for 
organization to exist. The following analysis focuses on the series of 
changes in the values of these elements--the chains of 
restructurings --which comprise the histories of CORE and SNCC. The 
relationships between these organizational changes, the achievement of 
success, and other organizational variables are also explored. Findings 
from the current work are compared to the findings from previous 
research using Kreps' theory in order to evaluate the generalizability 
of Kreps' work.
Findings for CORE and SNCC uncover a similar sequence of 
restructurings over the life histories of these social movement 
organizations. Additional similarities between the groups suggest that 
earlier restructurings take longer to complete, are more tranquile and 
are associated with relative prosperity. The achievement of success is 
associated with more extensive restructurings, changes which arise from 
nonconflictual catalysts, and periods of relative prosperity. Similar 
findings for coterminous time periods suggest the need for future 
research in order to isolate truly organizational patterns from broader 
societal influences. Similarities between SMO findings and previous 
non-SMO conclusions point to the generalizability of Kreps' theory of 
social structure.
ORGANIZATION AS PROCESS:
THE LIFE HISTORIES OF CORE AND SNCC
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
Analyses of social movement organizations (SMOs) have generated a 
plethora of competing and complementary theories. For the most part, 
these attempts to understand SMOs have looked at them as atypical 
entities which need to be understood in terms of their social 
psychological dimensions (Miller, 1986), or the underlying plausability 
and requisites of their existence (Oberschall, 1973; McCarthy and Zald, 
1977) . Even those analyses which have attempted to look at them as
groups per se have frequently focused on the unique aspects of protest
groups rather than on the underlying recognition of them as forms of
organization (Zald and Ash, 1966; Oberschall, 1979; Garason, 1975). A
potentially fruitful approach in studying these movement organizations 
is to view them not as unique entities somehow divorced from other more 
standard organizations, but rather as expressions of that social form we
call organization, but about which we actually know very little. By
analyzing SMOs according to a general theory of social structure, the 
research reported here attempts to illuminate the organizational
dynamics of SMOs and contribute to the refinement and generalizability
of a core species concept of organization.
The current work will focus on social movement organizations --or 
more specifically on the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)--as instances of
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organization. But, as is so intuitively apparent in such groups, 
organization cannot be conceived as static or absolute; rather it must 
be seen as both extant entity and continuously evolving process (Kreps, 
1985a). SNCC and CORE are definable units, but they are also units that 
change and evolve during their life histories. If we are going to grasp 
how these organizations change in a very specific way, it is necessary 
to move beyond broad assertions that they do change to very precise 
desciptions of how, when, and under what circumstances such changes 
occur.
In analyzing SMOs as organizations sui generis, several questions 
need to be answered. First, how can organization be captured accurately 
and precisely enough to delineate both its aspects of consistency along 
with its changes, transformations, and fluctuations? Then, if such 
structural components can be captured, can we trace this history of 
consistency and change in a way that meaningfully and validly captures 
the history of a specific SMO? Third, assuming the above questions can 
be addressed adequately, precisely how do SMOs change over time?
Fourth, is there any apparent patterning in these changes with regard to 
exogenous and endogenous variables? And if there are some discernible 
patterns, are they evident only within a single SMO's history or do they 
hold true across SMOs? Sixth, do these changes in any way appear to be 
related to the achievement of successes by the group? And finally, do 
the findings on SMOs appear to apply only to these protest groups, or 
are there findings that would suggest uniformities for organizations in 
general rather than just SMOs in particular? The current research seeks 
to answer these questions through a historical comparative analysis of 
CORE and SNCC. The analysis is built upon a core species concept of
organization formulated by Kreps (1985a, 1985b) and previous analysis of 
protest groups by Gamson (1975). Very brief synopses of the histories 
of CORE and SNCC provide an orientation to the substantive focus of this 
research before outlining the theoretical underpinnings in Kreps and 
Gamson.
CORE was founded in Chicago in the early 1940's. Throughout the 
1940's and '50's the organization engaged in small-scale nonviolent 
direct action against segregated public accommodations. With the onset 
of the 1960's and the Freedom Rides, CORE began a period of rapid growth 
and change. It expanded both its size and focus by becoming involved in 
voter registration, focusing on the more subtle forms of discrimination 
in housing and employment, and looking beyond integration to the 
problems of the black poor. From the onset of serious financial 
problems by the Spring of 1964 until the current analysis ends with the 
ascension of Roy Innis in 1968, CORE shifted its emphasis even further 
to community organizing and Black Power.
SNCC was started in 1960 as an attempt to coordinate the various 
campus protests that proliferated following the Greensboro sit-ins.
While the focus of the organization was originally to coordinate direct 
action protests against segregation, SNCC very shortly changed its 
emphasis to voter registration and community organizing in the Deep 
South. The summer of 1964 marks one of SNCC's most famous 
endeavors --Freedom Summer--and also the beginning of its decline. On 
the path to its virtual dissolution in 1969, SNCC moved its focus to the 
cities (with a corresponding abandonment of its previous rural 
projects), set off the wave of Black Power rhetoric, and formally 
excluded whites--all of which served to create internal friction and
further isolate the group.
KREPS' CORE SPECIES CONCEPT OF ORGANIZATION
Kreps' theory of social structure evolved from both grappling with 
the metatheoretical questions of action and order in social phenomena 
(Alexander, 1982) and an empirical mining of the Disaster Research 
Center's archives on community responses to natural disasters. All 
previous works building on Kreps' theory (Francis and Kreps, 1984; 
Kreps, 1985a, 1985b; Bosworth and Kreps, 1986; Saunders and Kreps, 
1986; Linn, 1986) have focused on the circumscribed temporal and 
spatial parameters of community responses to natural disasters. The 
present analysis of SNCC and CORE seeks to illustrate both the 
applicability of Kreps' theory in a non-disaster setting and, at the 
same time, to utilize this theory to examine a neglected aspect of 
social movement organizations--the dynamics of the organization itself.
Kreps delineates a taxonomy of structural forms from four core 
elements of organization: domains (D), tasks (T), resources (R), and
activities (A). Employed as a structural code, the elements capture 
empirically both the origins of new organizations and the 
transformations of existing ones. As expressed in Kreps' work, 
organization is posited as an paradox: it exists as a definable entity
which is constantly changing; but the change is constrained by what 
exists. In effect, organization must be described as unit and process 
s imultane ously.
The four elements are defined as follows (Bosworth and Kreps,
1986): Domains are collective representations of bounded units and
6TABLE 1
Taxonomy of Sixty-four Forms of Association
One Two Three Four
Element Element Element Element
Forms Forms Forms Forms
D D-T D-T-R D-T-R-A
T D-R D-T-A D-T-A-R
R D-A D-R-A D-R-A-T
A T-R D-R-T D-R-T-A
T-A D-A-T D-A-T-R
T-D D-A-R D-A-R-T
R-A T-R-A T-R-A-D
R-D T-R-D T-R-D-A
R-T T-A-D T-A-D-R
A-D T-A-R T-A-R-D
A-T T-D-R T-D-R-A
A-R T-D-A T-D-A-R
R-A-D R-A-D-T
R-A-T R-A-T-D
R-D-T R-D-T-A
R-D-A R-D-A-T
R-T-D R-T-D-A
R-T-A R-T-A-D
A-D-T A-D-T-R
A-D-R A-D-R-T
A-T-D A-T-D-R
A-T-R A-T-R-D
A-R-D A-R-D-T
A-R-T A-R-T-D
4 12 24 24
Total Forms of Association = 64
their reason for being. Tasks are collective representations of a 
division of labor for the enactment of human activities. Resources 
refer to individual capacities and collective technologies. And 
activities are the conjoined actions of individuals and social units.
By arranging the four elements in all logically possible combinations 
and permutations, a taxonomy of sixty-four alternative forms of social 
structure is derived (Table 1).
The elements are individually necessary and collectively sufficient 
for organization to exist. Thus only when all four elements are located 
empirically has organization come into being. With the quantitative 
transition from a three- to a four-element form, a corresponding change 
of system states occurs--from origins to maintenance The
maintenance system state is synonymous with organization. This system 
state involves various transformations of the elements until the 
organization goes out of existence. It is this period during which 
organization exists, and more specifically the elemental changes during 
this period, that are the focus of the following analysis of CORE and 
SNCC.
Restructuring
A dialectical view of organization as both process and unit demands 
that each of the four elements (D,T,R, and A) has an empirically 
tangible value. At the same time, it requires that changes within these 
values be documented. Restructuring is the term used to refer to 
instances of change in an organization's elemental values. An 
organization can undergo any number of these changes during the 
maintenance system state. It is the chronology of these 
transformations--the chains of restructurings--that comprises the
history of an organization. Delineating specific changes within the 
organization gets at the dialectical relationship between existing unit 
and continuously evolving process.
Restructuring occurs with a change in the value of one or more of 
the elements once they are all in place. Theoretically any 
restructuring affects all of the elements to some degree. However, in 
locating changes empirically, some of the elements do not change a 
perceptible amount. These thresholds of observability, imprecise though 
they are, serve as the guide for determining the form of each 
restructuring. A restructuring can display any of the sixty-four 
logically possible configurations of the elements (see Table 1), which 
are referred to as alternative forms of restructuring. The letters 
represent which of the four elements change, and the order of the 
letters indicates the temporal sequence of this change.
In addition to pointing to the dialectic of process and unit, the 
detailing of specific forms of restructuring points even more directly 
to the dialectical relationship between the means and the ends of 
organization. Activities (A) and resources (R) refer most explicitly to 
the means of organization, while domains (D) and tasks (T) refer to its 
ends. In means-based restructurings the organization's activities and 
usable resources are altered within relatively fixed collective 
representations of the group's focus and division of labor. Ends-based 
restructurings, in turn, are changes in the collective representations 
of the organization's focus and division of labor in conjunction with 
relatively unchanging resources and activities. In means-based 
restructurings participants are changing what they are doing or what 
they have to work with before (or without) a change in the
9organization's ends. In ends-based restructurings the collective 
representations associated with the organization are altered before (or 
without) a change in the organization’s means. Ends-based restructuring 
points to the participant as actor, manipulating the organization 
itself; while means-based restructuring suggests the participant as 
object, working within established organizational boundaries.
A dialectical approach implies some balancing of both types of 
restructuring during a social movement organization's life history.
While ends-based restructuring allows for greater flexibility, it also 
opens the possibility of uncertainty and confusion about the 
organization's goals and operation. On the other hand, means-based 
restructuring offers greater direction with its relatively stable ends, 
but it can produce an inflexibility that is detrimental in a rapidly 
changing environment. It is posited that the viability of a social 
movement organization, or of any organization, hinges on a balance or 
interplay between means-based and ends-based changes.
Delineating changes in each of the elements involves judgment, 
since discriminating thresholds are not explicit at this point. Looking 
at domains, tasks, resources, and activities in terms of social 
movements rather than disasters suggests the following representative 
examples of each element.
Activities refer to the types and amount of conjoined action 
carried out by CORE'S or SNCC's constituency (i.e. the people the group 
attracts to work for its cause). A restructuring of activities can 
indicate a significant increase or decrease in the amount of a 
particular activity, the commencement of a new type of activity, or the 
termination of an extant endeavor. An increase in the intensity and
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quantity of voter registration drives, a circumscribed change in 
activities such as the Freedom Rides, and a progressive radicalization 
of protest activities by participants are all examples of changes in 
activities.
Resources capture fluctuations in available money and the size and 
composition of the staff or constituency. A restructuring of resources 
takes into account the degree of change given the extant resources in 
addition to reflecting changes in absolute figures. A decrease or 
increase in contributions, CORE'S appointment of James Farmer as 
national director, an increased number of supporters, or a decrease in 
the dedication of SNCC's field staff are all considered to be 
significant changes in usable resources.
Tasks reflect the division of labor within the organization.
Changes in the internal boundary delineations as seen in the creation of 
new positions, the reassignment of responsibilities, and changes in the 
collective representations of who does what within the organization 
would all be recorded as restructurings of the task structure.
Domains are collective representations of bounded units and their 
reason for being. "Bounded units" include the ideological and purposive 
aspects of the organization (goals or legitimate focus) and the 
geographic locus of its activities. Both of these categories, though, 
must be recognizable as collective representations to be considered as 
components of the group's domain. Domains detail boundary demarcations 
involving the social world beyond the organization. CORE'S inclusion of 
the South, early SNCC's formal emphasis on voter registration and direct 
action, CORE'S shift of emphasis beyond integration to the problems of 
the black poor, and both groups' invocation of Black Power are all
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examples of domain restructuring.
The following example of a three-element (D-R-A) restructuring in 
SNCC illustrates the empirical delineation of these changes:
In September 1963 SNCC's executive committee committed the 
organization to a shift in its voter registration campaign. Before this 
date SNCC's drive to register voters had centered around registering 
black residents of the Deep South as qualified voters in accord with the 
states' obscure and frustrating registration requirements. The change 
in September to a formal platform of "one man, one vote" (D) abandoned 
the early more accomodating approach in favor of a belief that all 
blacks, regardless of educational attainment, deserved the right to 
vote. As such it signified a change in what the organization saw as its 
legitimate focus, not merely in what it was doing. November's election 
allowed SNCC to move beyond rhetoric to an implementation of its new 
emphasis. The proposed plan called for a SNCC-run and legally 
unrecognized election to take place on election day so that black 
Mississippians could demonstrate their desire to vote despite their 
conspicuous scarcity on Mississippi's lists of registered voters. Two 
weeks before the election, approximately one hundred students recruited 
from Yale and Stanford arrived to assist in the polling (R). On 
election day in early November, the first Freedom Vote took place (A). 
The turnout verified SNCC's claim that it was intimidation and 
discriminatory registration guidelines rather than apathy that kept 
Mississippi's black residents away from the legally sanctioned 
elections.
Restructurings, then, are changes within an organization during its 
maintenance period. The empirical application of this concept in the 
current work captures the series of changes--the chains of 
restructurings--that compose the histories of CORE and SNCC. As such it 
is an analytical tool that allows detailed discussion of the process of 
social movement organizations. Not only is it possible to delineate the 
chains of restructurings that constitute these organizations' histories, 
but it is also possible to determine precisely which of the crucial 
aspects of organization change in each instance. Thus, we can document 
dialectical tensions and patterns both within and across restructurings.
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GAMSON'S CATEGORIES OF SUCCESS
In addition to drawing on Kreps' work to analyze social movement 
organizations, Gamson's (1975) analysis of social protest groups comes 
into play. Gamson's study analyzes a representative sample of 
challenging groups in the United States between 1800 and 1945. He 
explores the permeability of a pluralistic society and finds influences 
of organizational, ideological, and operational variables on the groups' 
chances of success.
For this analysis of CORE and SNCC, Gamson's work contributes to 
the conceptualization of the achievement of success as an indicator of 
effective response. In Kreps' original work the criteria for deeming a 
disaster-related organization successful was "need met, response 
terminated." For SMOs such a simple criterion does not capture the 
essense of effective response. Mere longevity is not a valid indicator 
of an effective protest, and there is no "normal state," as in 
disasters, toward which the organization is striving to return. An 
operational conceptualization of success, then, provides a basis for 
looking at the SMOs not merely as strings of restructurings, but also as 
historical entities which attained various types and degrees of desired 
change. In short, it gives an indication of how well the groups did 
what they set out to do.
Gamson proposes two heuristic categories of success--(1) acceptance 
for the group itself as a legitimate spokesman for a constituency 
(Gamson, 1975:31), and (2) gains in advantages for the intended 
beneficiaries (Gamson, 1975:34). Within the category of acceptance, 
four specific types of such legitimacy are delineated: consultation,
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negotiations, formal recognition, and inclusion. Consultation involves 
an exchange of ideas initiated by the antagonist. N e g o t i a t i o n s  must 
occur between the challenging group and the antagonist on a continuous 
basis, not just in times of crisis. Formal recognition entails an 
explicit (usually written) statement by the antagonist recognizing the 
challenging group as a legitimate spokesman for the constituency. 
Finally, inclusion occurs when a member (or members) simultaneously 
retains his membership in the challenging group and is placed in a 
position of status or authority in the antagonist's organizational 
structure.
The second major category of success--the gaining of new 
advantages - - is achieved when a common good (Olson cited in Oberschall, 
1975) is garnered for the SMO's beneficiary. A common good is a benefit 
that is distributed among all members of the group the SMO is attempting 
to assist by its activities and program, not just those who actively 
participate in the campaign for change.
Gamson scores each challenging group at the end of its protest 
period with a series of pluses (+) and minuses (-) to derive a single 
indicator of the group's level of success. Because the current focus is 
not only the overall levels of success for CORE and SNCC, but also the 
relationship between restructurings and success, a modified system is 
employed. Rather than creating one final score which respresents the 
group's level of success for its entire history, each gain in either 
acceptance or advantages for CORE or SNCC is recorded. In the final 
analysis, this results in a series of successes, which can then be 
anayzed both in composite and individually with relation to relevant 
restructurings.
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Successes in the current sense are rather tangible 
things--accomplishments that can be quantified or located in legal 
edicts or formal meetings. Increases in the number of registered voters 
in the Deep South, desegregation of specific public accommodations, 
legislation outlawing segregation in various facilities, a meeting with 
a federal government official, or a preferential hiring agreement are 
examples of gains which are recorded as instances of success.
METHODOLOGY
The analysis of CORE and SNCC incorporates an intertwining of both
qualitative and quantitative techniques. The data for the qualitative
descriptions of the changes and successes in CORE and SNCC were garnered
primarily from existing histories by both professional historians and
participants in the organizations. Original documents were used only
sparsely to fill in gaps or to clarify issues in the comprehensive 
2
histories . A general chronology detailing the course of each 
organization's history was created and augmented from the.various 
sources. Each entry in this chronology was then analyzed to determine 
if it constituted a restructuring or an instance of success for the 
group. If it was deemed a significant restructuring or success, the 
form of the variable was determined and a detailed description was 
recorded.
After reanalysis of the historical sources, in an attempt to 
accumulate an exhaustive list of restructurings and successes, the 
qualitative descriptions of each restructuring and success were 
quantified to allow for statistical analyses (see Codebook, Appendix A).
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Due to the exploratory nature of this investigation, statistical 
analyses focus on correlations among various aspects of restructuring, 
success, and organizational characteristics at the time of each 
restructuring or success. These correlations indicate the direction and 
magnitude of relationships among the central variables which suggest 
tentative hypotheses about the dynamics and successes of social movement 
organizations. By retaining and incorporating the qualitative 
descriptions which preceded this quantitative analysis, both the 
mathematical precision of statistics and the descriptive validity of 
qualitative data come together to give a more accurate depiction of the 
organizations under scrutiny.
OVERVIEW OF FOLLOWING CHAPTERS
The following chapter details the chains of restructurings and 
instances of success that comprise the histories of CORE and SNCC. 
Historical narratives with detailed descriptions of several 
restructurings in text provide an orientation to these histories and 
more fully demonstrate the application of Kreps1 theory in the social 
movement realm. The narratives are augmented by Appendix B, which 
provides complete chronologies, in list form, of both organizations’ 
restructurings and successes. Chapter two concludes with a detailed 
critique of the application of Kreps' theory in this new substantive 
area. Chapter three explores a more quantitative analysis of the 
histories of CORE and SNCC. It begins with a delineation of patterns in 
the forms of restructurings, timing of restructurings, and successes, 
both within and between CORE and SNCC. A transitional section
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introduces the central variables of the statistical analyses. The 
remaining portions of chapter three detail the various correlations 
among these variables. Chapter four focuses on the generalizability of 
Kreps' theory. The current findings on social movement organizations 
are compared to previous disaster-related conclusions in an attempt to 
identify commonalities which refer to organization, regardless of the 
substantive context in which it occurs. Concluding comments synthesize 
the findings and offer cautions and directions for future studies.
Several boundary delineations and specifications must be kept in 
mind throughout these following chapters. The focus of the analysis of 
CORE and SNCC is pointedly on social movement organizations as 
organizations. Therefore the following discussions focus on the 
structural elements and variables associated with organization itself.
In an attempt to communicate precisely what a structural framework can 
illuminate, non-organizational variables which may provide clarity or 
explanation about historical occurrences will not formally enter the 
study. This leads to a second specification--the emphasis on 
description rather than explanation. This research seeks to explore the 
sequences of changes and successes within CORE'S and SNCC's maintenance 
system states. It is concerned with a precise detailing of what 
happened rather than with an explanation of why it occurred. Finally, 
the analysis of CORE and SNCC focuses on these groups as broad regional 
or national entities. It is the wholes, analytically distinct from 
their sub-unit parts, which are the focal units of study. The dual 
attempt throughout is to shed light on the organizational dynamics of 
social movement organizations and to assess the generalizability of 
Kreps' core species concept of organization.
CHAPTER TWO
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF KREPS' THEORY: CORE AND SNCC
The following histories of CORE and SNCC convey the histories as 
they are depicted in restructurings and successes. These histories 
include only the organizational details that can be captured by the 
framework derived from Kreps' and Gamson's theories. Additional 
interpretive comments are withheld to avoid distorting or embellishing 
the historical accounts that structural analysis can provide. The 
majority of restructurings are discussed simply as portions of a running 
historical narrative. However, representative restructurings are 
delineated in more precise detail to illustrate the determination of 
instances of restructuring in this historical context. (See Appendix B 
for complete chronologies of restructurings and successes in CORE and 
SNCC.)
CORE: 1941 - 1968
The temporal sequence of CORE'S origins is best depicted by an 
R-A-D-T sequence:
In October 1941 the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) founded a 
"peace team" in Chicago. The young members of this pacifist enclave met 
for weekly discussions which often centered around the application of 
Gandhian techniques to the racial issue (R). Cell members established 
Fellowship House to challenge housing restrictions in Chicago, and in 
March 1942 engaged in their first large scale direct action project
17
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against the segregated White City Roller Rink (A). Riding the 
enthusiasm generated by the White City project, fifty people met in 
April to form a "permanent interracial group committed to the use of 
nonviolent direct action opposing discrimination" (D). This formalized 
domain was externally legitimated by FOR1s agreement to retain James 
Farmer on its payroll with a primary responsibility of establishing this 
new group. Between the summers of 1942 and 1943 a task structure 
evolved which was composed of a set of committees and three action units 
concerned with specific spheres of segregated facilities (T).
By 1943, then, all four elements were present and organization is
considered to exist. At this early stage CORE was explicitly
interracial and nonviolent. Among the small band of members, many were
pacifists and virtually all were college educated.
The new organization's first restructuring occurred in June 1943. 
The domain (D) of the organization was extended beyond Chicago in a 
federation of local units working to abolish the color line through 
direct nonviolent action; and the task structure (T) was redefined to 
include a chairman and a combination secretary/treasurer, and to make 
the relationship between the central office and the local units that of 
a loose federation.
CORE showed a tendency throughout the 1940's toward restructuring 
the ends of the organization. More specifically, the task structure was 
repeatedly restructured in an ongoing effort to more effectively 
coordinate the local units' activities and to give more control to the 
central office. Two important exceptions to this trend were the 
commencing of a national project as seen in the Journey of 
Reconciliation and an explicit statement excluding communist-controlled 
groups from CORE'S ranks.
The 1950's began on an unpromising note with activities, 
membership, and income noticeably declining. With a rather complex 
restructuring in the summer of 1951 the task structure was altered to
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create the position of part-time fund raiser. James Robinson filled 
this position, and the active pursuit of funds increased. This 
restructuring, in turn, served as a catalyst for a perceptible increase 
in monetary resources by the summer of 1954. In the latter half of the 
decade, the promotion of Robinson to executive secretary and the 
beginning of interest and activities in the South were setting the 
course for CORE'S tremendous growth in the '60's.
The Greensboro sit-ins of February 1960 served as an external 
catalyst which sparked an A-T-R restructuring in CORE:
Almost immediately following the initial sit-ins CORE'S activities 
broadened and increased. The field workers intensified their efforts to 
initiate new chapters in the South and to teach protesters proper 
nonviolent techniques. Activity in the North also surged with the 
proliferation of sympathy protests (A). Two months later, in April,
CORE altered its task structure to allow for three additional field
secretary positions (bringing the total to five) under the leadership of 
the newly created field director (T). At its annual convention in July, 
CORE expanded this response to the new fervor in the South by recruiting 
the help of student advisors to encourage ties between the student 
movement and CORE. It also shifted the bulk of its field workers and
funds to the campaigns in the South (R).
A change of leadership in early 1961 brought James Farmer to the 
position of National Director. One of Farmer's first undertakings in 
his new position was a change in activities as seen in the resurgence of 
a truly national project--the Freedom Rides:
The Freedom Rides were carried out to test compliance with the 
Supreme Court's Boynton decision which prohibited segregation on 
carriers and terminal facilities connected with interstate travel. The 
Rides were modeled on CORE'S Journey of Reconciliation during the 
1940's, but the Rides of the 1960's were more daring in the plan to 
penetrate the Deep South. On May 4, 1961 CORE commenced the Freedom 
Rides as an interracial group of thirteen people left Washington D.C. 
on a bus headed South (A). CORE'S segment of the Rides continued for 
two weeks.
This was a crucial undertaking for CORE and one which can be causally 
linked to the September Interstate Commerce Commission order banning
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segregation in facilities connected with interstate travel (a success in 
the form of advantages). These Rides sparked enthusiasm for CORE's 
programs and served as a catalyst for a change in resources as seen in 
the commencement of an upward trend in membership during later 1961 and 
into 1962. As an answer to this growing size, CORE restructured and 
augmented its task structure in an attempt to best coordinate and 
accommodate this increased size.
Beginning in early 1962 CORE shifted its activities from rather 
narrowly bounded civil rights issues and targets (in the form of public 
accommodations) to the more general problems of housing and employment. 
This shift and the increasing proportion of blacks (especially working 
class blacks) joining the organization led finally, by the fall of 1963, 
to a change in domain beyond integration to the problems of the black 
poor. As far as successes are concerned, the Route 40 Freedom Ride, the 
following Freedom Highways campaign in the summer of 1962, and the 
Sealtest preferential hiring agreement later in 1962 account for the 
last major block of successes that can be attributed to the national 
organization itself.
Martin Luther King's Birmingham campaign in May 1963 sparked new 
interest in civil rights. For CORE this increased publicity of an 
external occurrence acted as a catalyst for an R-A restructuring:
Immediately following King's May campaign, CORE's useable resources 
increased on all fronts. People rushed to join the group while existing 
members became more involved and active. In addition, many non-members 
participated in CORE's protests, making demonstrations and projects 
larger than ever before. The increases were not limited to human 
resources, as contributions rose significantly in the aftermath of this 
catalyst (R). By mid-summer, two months after the benchmark of a change 
in resources, the number of direct action projects carried through by 
CORE flourished. Not only did the volume of protest increase, but its 
character also shifted. The formerly disciplined nonviolent
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demonstrations for integration were increasingly replaced by civil 
disobedience by protesters who courted arrests and minimized the role of 
negotiations (A).
By the following Spring the size and frequency of protests were 
noticeably decreasing and direct action became a decreasingly important 
activity.
A decline in contributions in the Spring of 1964 combined with a 
standing history of overspending placed CORE quite firmly in debt. By 
late 1964 this financial difficulty had become urgent enough to 
necessitate an additional transformation of resources--securing loans, 
closing down some offices, and streamlining the field staff. Following 
the initial set-back in usable money in early 1964, CORE focused direct 
and singular attention on its ends for the first time since the 1950's 
and created Regional Action Councils in yet another attempt to 
reorganize its task structure to more effectively coordinate its parts.
During the ensuing year CORE changed both its activities and its 
domain to incorporate partisan politics. This period during late 1964 
also witnessed the increasing importance of community organizing--first 
as an activity and then as a formalized domain. By September of 1965 
this trend was so pronounced that the previous emphasis on voter 
registration was virtually abandoned as this concentration on community 
organizing around the felt-needs of the community came to dominate 
activities.
From the 1965 annual convention until I stop tracing the 
organization in 1968, CORE progressively edged toward a more radical and 
exclusively black focus. At the 1965 convention the long-debated 
question of the role of whites in the organization was finally formally 
addressed with a specification of tasks which decreed "members of the
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minority community shall substantially constitute the leadership of the 
chapters." The gradual dwindling of finances and constituency allowed 
long-subverted criticisms of Farmer to surface, finally resulting in a 
change of leadership to Floyd McKissick in January 1966. Controversy 
surrounding the selection of McKissick created further friction and a 
substantial number of resignations by key staff members.
The pronouncement of Black Power, a dismissal of the standing 
commitment to nonviolence, and an anti-war pronouncement at the 1966 
convention formalized the continuing trend toward separatism and 
radicalism. Almost instantly this extensive change in domain led to a 
significant drop in contributions and the loss of most remaining white 
supporters. The trend toward black exclusivity was even more fully 
articulated at the 1968 convention with the change in leadership from 
McKissick to Roy Innis, an explicit transition in domain from civil 
rights to black nationalism and an accompanying formal exclusion of 
whites, and a transformation of the task structure to a much smaller 
more centralized staff. Although CORE limped along into the early 
1970's, at this point in 1968 it seems to have made a sufficient break 
with its past to consider the original CORE defunct, and my analysis 
ends .
SNCC: 1960 - 1969
The origins of SNCC can be characterized as a D-R-T-A form:
An invitation sent by the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference's Ella Baker succeeded in bringing together two hundred 
representatives from Southern college protest groups to coordinate their 
disparate projects. At this founding meeting in April 1960, the
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representatives adopted a religious and philosophical treaty on 
nonviolence as their statement of purpose and agreed that the group 
should coordinate communications between local groups (D). In June a 
temporary office worker was hired to oversee the newly donated corner of 
SCLC's Atlanta office (R). At its October meeting the group created a 
formal task structure. The coordinating committee was to include one 
representative from each of the sixteen Southern states and the District 
of Columbia. Local groups would still be autonomous, and each member of 
the coordinating committee was authorized to speak on behalf of the 
group (T). The coordinating committee was relatively inactive until 
February 1961. At this point, eleven months after origins began, SNCC 
responded to pleas for assistance from students in the Rock Hill jail-in 
by sending representatives to join the demonstration (A).
Shortly after organization was achieved in February 1961, SNCC members
were invited to a meeting with President Kennedy to discuss voter
registration. This meeting (to which CORE leaders and other major civil
rights leaders also were invited) constitutes an instance of
consultation--a type of acceptance within Gamson's categories of
success.
Unlike CORE, which formally excluded communists from the 
organization, SNCC's first restructuring involved its assertion of free 
association in conjunction with its acceptance of a grant from the 
Southern Conference Educational Fund. Also during the summer of 1961, 
SNCC began the transition from a coordinating committee to a field-based 
organization with the creation of a field worker position which was 
filled by Charles Sherrod. Later in the summer Bob Moses and two 
volunteers began voter registration efforts in Mississippi. This area 
of activity was formalized in August in the compromise which created 
both direct action and voter registration wings, with accompanying 
changes in tasks, activities, and resources.
Publicity of Bob Moses and his co-workers' activities is regarded 
as the catalyst which preceded a complex (R-D-A-T) restructuring in the
Fall of 1961:
24
Twelve students decided to drop out of college to work full-time 
for SNCC (R). A month later at the October staff meeting, the March on 
Mississippi was adopted as the focus of SNCC's activities to be carried 
through by this new full-time contingent. By adopting this campaign, 
SNCC refocused its scope of influence by recognizing the Deep South 
rather than college campuses of the entire South as its legitimate locus 
of activities (D). Very shortly after this reformulation of SNCC's 
focus, field workers began to shift their activities from the rather 
narrowly delimited areas of direct action and voter registration to the 
more general emphasis on community organizing in the black communities 
of Mississippi (A). With this addition of new staff, the change in 
domain, and the more diffuse activities directed at bringing communities 
together to realize their own potential, SNCC's center of power shifted 
(T). The coordinating committee became merely the titular head of the 
group. After this Fall it was the actions of the field staff rather 
than the decisions of the coordinating committee that formulated SNCC's 
policy.
Throughout SNCC's history there was an unresolved tension between 
members who abhorred any suggestion of creating internal hierarchies or 
bureaucracy and those who felt that SNCC needed some type of formal 
organizational configuration to be effective and durable. By late 1961 
Jim Forman, SNCC's new executive secretary and a strong advocate of this 
latter view, began pushing for more organizational structure within 
SNCC. During the ensuing year or so the task structure was modified to 
include a set of specialized jobs in public relations and coordination. 
Strategic resources were augmented when key people were introduced to 
fill these positions.
Another facet of this protracted debate about the internal 
organization of SNCC itself was the related issue of SNCC's role with 
relation to the local communities in which it worked. On this question, 
SNCC formally specified very early that local leadership should be 
encouraged regardless of the more finely honed organization or 
communication skills of the more formally educated SNCC members. This 
simple declaration did not avert all conflicts, however, especially with
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the influx of white volunteers during and after Freedom Summer.
By the spring of 1962 there was a discernible trend toward a more 
radical staff. New SNCC members were likely to be radicalized and 
involved in the civil rights movement before they joined SNCC. 
Simultaneously, current members were quickly becoming radicalized by 
their harsh experiences in the Deep South--leading overall to an 
increasingly radical band of workers.
SNCC had carved a niche for itself in the most inauspicious of 
territorial domains--the Deep South. When Voter Education Project funds 
were allocated in the sumer of 1962, they were distributed on the basis 
of anticipated success in voter registration drives. SNCC therefore 
received very limited support. To augment this sum, SNCC adjusted its 
domain to focus its fund raising activities in the North and 
restructured resources by hiring white staff members to man these 
offices. By the end of the year these northern efforts produced a 
significant increase in income so that SNCC ended the year out of debt. 
In addition to strictly financial support, these northern affiliates 
also provided donations that made it possible for SNCC to successfully 
carry out additional peripheral activities such as the LeFlore County 
food drive in late 1962.
By the summer of 1963 SNCC had made some significant gains in voter 
registration (a success in the form of advantages). However it was the 
relative insignificance of these gains compared to the enormity of the 
work that needed to be done, rather than the achievement itself, that 
affected SNCC's future course. In response to this dubious success,
SNCC carried out the restructuring detailed in Chapter One by shifting 
to a "one man, one vote" doctrine and program.
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During the Spring of 1964 SNCC expanded its activities in the North 
in a successful effort to raise funds and foster alliances for its 
proposed summer project--Freedom Summer. This summer itself is 
expressed as an R-A restructuring:
Freedom Summer was a plan to recruit Northern college students to 
spend their summer working with black residents of rural Mississippi. 
Beginning in May SNCC underwent a shifting and augmenting of resources. 
The organization shifted the bulk of its resources away from its more 
dispersed projects and into the Freedom Summer jurisdictions in 
Mississippi. The augmentation of resources included the arrival of 
Northern volunteers beginning in June (R). With this influx of a large 
number of highly educated volunteers, SNCC diversified and expanded its 
activities. Existing activities such as voter registration were 
magnified. In addition new activities such as Freedom Schools, which 
sought to supplement local black's inadequate public education, were 
implemented (A). This change in resources and activities continued, as 
anticipated, throughout the summer.
During this time SNCC was in an interesting and uncertain 
organizational state. While it was definitely in existence (although 
arguably as a one- to three-element form rather than an organization), 
its primary activities were carried out under the auspices of the 
Council of Federated Organizations (COFO) and the Mississippi Freedom 
Democratic Party (MFDP). It was under these two banners that SNCC's 
successes of this summer of 1964 occurred. First, SNCC (COFO) managed 
to register, either as bona fide voters or as MFDP voters, a sizeable 
number of Mississippians (success--advantages). Second, the MFDP 
challenge at Atlantic City can be seen as inclusion, a form of 
acceptance. Like its previous gain in voter registration, however, 
these successes were viewed by outsiders, rather than by SNCC, as 
meaningful changes ^.
In September 1964 SNCC encountered another restructuring as a 
result of Freedom Summer. When SNCC recruited the Northern volunteers 
for the summer project it was anticipated and expected that they would 
depart when the summer was over. At the conclusion of the project,
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though, approximately eighty of these summer volunteers chose to remain 
in Mississippi to become full-time SNCC workers instead of returning to 
school (R). This unanticipated retention of a sizeable white 
constituency in SNCC's full-time staff radically altered the 
organization's racial composition. It also compounded the simmering 
question of the role of whites in SNCC.
After Freedom Summer SNCC began to lose the support and financial 
backing of northern liberals, and the performance and reliability of its 
staff waned. In this "freedom high" period many projects fell apart and 
were terminated due to a lack of dependable staff. Similar to the 
occurrence in CORE, this set-back in usable resources was followed by a 
singular restructuring of the task structure--the first such 
concentrated focus on ends in nearly three years. This trend of 
declining income and increasingly uncommitted staff was marked by a 
virtual end of institutional support by the end of 1965 and another 
series of office closings due to inactive staff in the summer of 1966.
A contested election in May 1966 brought Stokely Carmichael in as 
chairman and created a secretariat of members who favored greater 
militance. This tendency toward greater militance was soon proclaimed 
to the nation in Carmichael's infamous and inflammatory (but imprecise) 
change in domain to Black Power.
In addition to its proclamation of Black Power, SNCC shifted and 
broadened its scope by focusing on international events. As early as 
1964 and throughout 1966-67 members made both SNCC-authorized and 
unauthorized visits to African and other foreign nations. The 
incorporation of an anti-war stance through a written denunciation of 
U.S. involvement in Vietnam in January 1966 was SNCC's first official 
venture outside of explicitly domestic racial issues. By May 1967 with 
Rap Brown's ascension to chairman, the group proclaimed itself to be a
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human rights organization and formally set up an international affairs 
commission. A final involvement in international events served as a 
catalyst to further alienate SNCC from its remaining white supporters.
A pro-Palestinian article authored by a SNCC member was interpreted by 
readers as a reflection of SNCC's formal position on the Mid-East 
conflict and caused a substantial drop in the already dwindling 
contributions.
As early as the first half of 1965, SNCC began activities in urban 
areas in conjunction with Julian Bond's campaign for the Georgia House 
of Representatives. However it was not until the fall of 1966 that this 
transition was definite, as urban areas, rather than the rural Deep 
South, became SNCC's legitimate domain. A gradual shift of staff to 
cities of the North (in addition to some cities in the South) could, by 
this date, be considered a definite redefinition of the organization's 
reason for being. With this transition to urban areas, the previous 
projects and communities of the rural Deep South were virtually 
abandoned.
By this point SNCC was crumbling both internally and externally. 
Chairman Rap Brown's preoccupation with his own legal entanglements 
meant that SNCC had a very visible but ineffectual chairman. With 
Brown's resignation in June 1968 SNCC reconstituted its central 
structure to appoint nine deputy chairmen. Internal bickering escalated 
as SNCC declined, and during 1968 two distinct firings--Carmichael in 
June and Sellers and Ricks in December--were evidence of the critical 
evaluations of the old members by the newer SNCC people and of a 
last-ditch attempt to rid the organization of those people who were seen 
as responsible for its decline.
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Finally in June 1969 Rap Brown and a band of followers demanded 
control of the organization which they redefined as a paramilitary unit. 
With this usurpation Forman, a remaining vestige of "old SNCC," 
resigned. The revised SNCC was nominally headed by Brown but controlled 
by the Revolutionary Political Council. Like CORE, SNCC straggled on 
for several more years; but with a renaming as the Student National 
Coordinating Committee, it was sufficiently divorced from its 
predecessor to consider my analysis complete.
FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF KREPS' THEORY
The narratives above, in conjunction with the detailed accounts of 
several restructurings in text and the chronologies provided in Appendix 
B, demonstrate that Kreps' theory can capture much of what constitutes 
the histories of CORE and SNCC. Before proceeding to the actual 
analysis of these relationships among the separate variables, I am going 
to conclude this chapter with a more detailed discussion of the specific 
criteria and the difficulties associated with using Kreps1 theory in 
such historical arenas.
In the switch from disasters to social movement organizations, 
domain is the most difficult of Kreps' elements to translate. Tasks as 
an internal division of labor, resources as usable assets, and 
activities as conjoined action translate fairly easily from 
disaster-oriented definitions to social movement organizations.
Domains, however, are somewhat troublesome. In disasters domains are 
seen as the ends of organization which are expressed in both internal 
and external legitimation. In social movement organizations this
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concept of legitimation is much more difficult to grasp. At times 
internal legitimation is tenuous; for my research such restructurings 
were not characterized as changes in domain if internal legitimation was 
unclear. External legitimation, though, leads to a variety of difficult 
problems. Rarely is there written communication indicating what the 
focus of the organization should be. Also, there is rarely any formal 
external acknowledgement, let alone support, of the groups' specific 
sphere of influence. If the distinctions to be made are simply, for
example, civil rights/beyond civil rights, these are rather clear. But
CORE and SNCC are more intricate and subtle than these gross categories 
would indicate, and a meaningful discussion of their patterns of 
restructuring needs to capture more than such simple dichotomous 
distinctions.
Since formal domains are so rarely specified, it becomes necessary 
to make more subjective judgments than would be the ideal situation. 
While formal recognition of a domain is rarely given positively, it is 
sometimes acknowledged through the condemnation of external sources.
This is particularly clear in the transition to Black Power. Few 
sources applauded the change, but many gave it legitimacy with their 
denunciations. For my purposes, such refutations constitute external 
legitimation. These responses are acknowledging the group's 
collectively represented legitimate sphere of activity, despite the fact 
that the external source does not agree with the propriety of such a 
focus.
At other times it is difficult to get any reliable picture of how a 
change is regarded externally. In these cases the original positioning 
of domains in the model as ends of organization must be foremost in the
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researcher's mind. Take, for example, the transition that both CORE and 
SNCC made to urban ghettos. It is clearly not that they simply changed 
their activities (means) to include techniques applicable in an urban 
area. Rather they came to see their legitimate focus as these ghettos 
and their residents. This is definitely a shift in their reason for 
being, not simply in what they are doing. Therefore, regardless of 
formal legitimation, this change is seen as an adoption of a new domain. 
This explains how I can state, in my analysis of SNCC, that it was 
involved in urban activities in 1965 and early '66 but did not gain 
urban areas as part of its domain until late in 1966. In the early 
attempts it changed only its activities. Only later did it incorporate 
urban areas as a sphere it specifically wanted to influence rather than 
as just a particular arena for its activities. A very elusive 
distinction at times, but the strictest observance of means/ends 
distinctions is necessary to capture accurately what is changed. Are 
the goals and focus changing, or is it merely a change in the actions 
being employed and carried out?
A final question on determining domains: if legitimation is
supposed to come from both internal and external sources, who are the 
relevant others who can provide external legitimation? In disasters 
where formal recognition is much cleaner, this isn't terribly difficult 
to ascertain. In social movement organizations, it becomes rather 
tricky. The group's antagonists are one possibility of relevant others. 
These individuals or groups, though, often concentrate on the group as a 
whole rather than on what the group and others perceive as its purpose. 
They see the group in caricatured terms and often are quite oblivious to 
its subtle (and even not so subtle) changes.
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For SNCC and CORE, the black population could be seen en masse as 
the relevant others. But then the question of what constitutes 
legitimation becomes cloudy. If any blacks follow a group in a certain 
pursuit, does that become a legitimate domain of the organization? This 
criterion makes the distinction between activites and domains, or means 
and ends, rather moot. Ostensibly, a social movement organization 
cannot carry out activities without some people joining it. Therefore 
all activities would become domains.
Another possibility is other similar social movement 
organizations-- in these particular cases other civil rights groups.
For most restructurings this set of relevant others is a fairly good 
source of external support or denunciation--either way giving external 
validity to the fact that the group is now seen as having a specific 
area in its legitimate domain, regardless of the externally perceived 
legitimacy of the domain itself.
Once again the most important determination of domain is gained by 
searching for the organization's members' collective representation of 
what they should be doing (D) (in terms of legitimate focus, not in 
moralistic terms) rather than just what they are doing (A). While the 
concept of external legitimation is important to see organization as an 
open system, perhaps for organizations that are not working within 
prescribed spheres, it is sufficient to view the concept of open system 
as involving boundary delineations with the broader environment, while 
closed system (tasks) involves only the inner workings of the 
organization itself.
A few questions with regard to the restructurings themselves need 
to be addressed. First, how can separate restructurings be delineated?
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It is quite simple to say that analytically restructurings are separated 
by temporal and/or spatial disjunctions and that between each 
restructuring there is some configuration of the elements that can be 
considered a normal or stable state of some defined length. In reality 
it is not this clear cut. For in analyzing a national or regional 
organization many things are apparently occurring simultaneously or in a 
long chain of events that could perhaps be seen as a single 
restructuring. What becomes crucial in these distinctions between 
separate restructurings are both discontinuities in time and/or space, 
and unique identifiable catalysts to each restructuring. Keeping these 
three distinctions in mind makes delineations between most 
restructurings fairly clear. A unique value on any, not necessarily 
all, of these criteria can be used to isolate a unique restructuring.
There are instances, though, in which it is difficult to determine 
if one restructuring ends and then this restructuring serves as a 
catalyst for a second unique restructuring, or if both restructurings 
are really part of one larger restructuring. Again, it is important to 
look for discontinuities in time, space, and catalysts. Cases in which 
the organization seems to be at some sort of equilibrium between the 
changes and with unique catalysts, are documented as separate 
restructurings. If, however, regardless of time breaks, an initial 
change appears to be preparatory for an additional change and the 
organization is not really, then, at rest between the two instances of 
change, the restructuring is considered to be one larger restructuring. 
This implies a common problem of historical research: were the two
changes seen as united by the participants, or is their connection 
apparent only in retrospect.
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Another problem in the determination of unique restructurings 
occurs when a change in a single element leads to another change in the 
same element. For instance a change in R in the form of hiring new 
fund-raisers, produces an increase in income (also R). From the above 
guidelines, this may appear to be a single restructuring. Here, though, 
it is important to keep both theoretical and empirical distinctions in 
mind--a change in R is a change in R, but a change in people is not a
change in money. If both the additional staff and the increase in
income are considered to be individually significant changes, they 
cannot be captured by recording a single change in R. In these cases 
the first change is regarded as a completed restructuring and then is 
cited as the catalyst for the second change.
Moving out of the rather circumscribed time and space of disasters 
also makes it increasingly difficult to focus on the relevant unit of 
analysis. CORE and SNCC are regional or national organizations which 
are composed of smaller units of variously defined clarity and autonomy. 
This is particularly relevant in CORE, where each local unit has its own 
officers, funds, and individual projects. Although I have not analyzed 
them, I would suspect that New York CORE or St. Louis CORE or, for that
matter, SNCC's Lowndes County activities or Atlanta project are as
analytically viable as organizations as CORE and SNCC themselves. It 
must be remembered, though, that just because New York CORE is involved 
in employment campaigns, or Atlanta Project workers are vehemently 
anti-white does not mean that an element in the larger organization's 
configuration has restructured. These are units within a larger unit, 
and when the larger unit is the focus of analysis it must always be the 
specific locus of restructurings.
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Focusing on a single unit of analysis is crucial to depict 
accurately the structural configuration and changes of this given 
entity. At the same time, though, it necessarily oversimplifies the 
dynamics of the entire organization (which includes these smaller 
units). It portrays an artificial sense of stability and linear change 
that is frequently much more conflictual and chaotic in reality. 
Elemental values in some component units may be ahead, behind, or in 
actual conflict with the broader organization's values. However if this
difference is never recognized by the larger organization in the form of
a restructuring, it will go unrecorded in this research.
In addition to creating a sense of stability due to the single unit
of analysis, the focus on restructurings themselves creates a facade of 
artificial calm and consensus. Take for instance the question of the 
role of whites in both CORE and SNCC. This question was not formally 
resolved until fairly late in each organization's history. However, the 
fact that it was not resolved earlier does not mean that it was not a 
recurrent problem. In reality it was a hotly debated issue for several 
years before it was addressed in a restructuring. If an existing 
problem is never resolved or manifested in a restructuring, it will not 
formally become a part of the analysis. In a history depicted through 
restructurings much of the intraorganizational dissension and dynamism 
is buried because it never, or only very belatedly, becomes manifest in 
a structural change. Perhaps incorporating an analysis of unanswered 
catalysts would reduce this bias toward stability: perhaps what an
organization doesn't do is as important as what it does.
This underlying lack of stability and consensus is depicted in part 
in the time lag between a catalyst and its subsequent restructuring. In
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most instances, though, a specific event shortly before the 
restructuring serves as the "straw that breaks the camel's back," and 
therefore the long-standing dissensus and unrest remains effectively 
hidden. Perhaps it would be more accurate to declare the first evidence 
of problem in an area as the catalyst. This modified technique would 
more obviously display the long-standing uncertainty that eventually is 
manifested in a restructuring. At the same time, though, a complete 
exclusion of immediate catalysts would obscure those occurrences that 
directly bring about change.
Assigning time dimensions to restructurings presents several 
difficulties. Take the Freedom Rides as an example. CORE's segment of 
the Rides lasted two weeks. Since the Rides are considered to involve a 
change in only one element (A), however, they are recorded as a single 
date. As another example look at SNCC's Food Drive of October 1962 
through the following spring. Since it, too, is only a change in 
activities (A), it is recorded simply as October 1962. Although this 
creates a linearity in the sequence of restructurings that does not 
correspond precisely to reality, this technique of using the first date 
at which an element changes appears to be the best means of handling 
this ambiguity: regardless of the duration of the new value of the
restructured element(s), there is a discernible point at which a change 
is noted. The two types of cases in which this question arises are 
temporary shifts in the value of one or more elements and trends, or
gradually changing values of the elements.
A temporary change in an element (i.e., the element changes its 
value and then reverts to its previous value) is recorded temporally as
occurring at the onset of the change. A difficulty with some
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restructurings like these is that often the reversion to the original 
value of the element is not a meaningful change for the unit. Take for 
instance Freedom Summer and the tremendous influx of white volunteers. 
The increased resources represented by these volunteers is definitely a 
significant change; however, the fact that most of the students left at 
the end of the summer is not really a significant restructuring.
Granted human resources are decreased here, and rather significantly 
numerically. But in terms of the organization, this loss is not 
considered to be a restructuring because the students were brought in 
for a predetermined time period and were leaving at the predetermined 
time. (This is similar to receiving a grant--it is the reception of the 
grant that is important; it is not considered to be a separate 
restructuring when the grant has all been spent.) What is significant 
for SNCC is not that the majority of the students left, but rather that 
80 of them stayed. In other words if something occurs temporarily when 
it was anticipated to be temporary, its conclusion is not a separate 
restructuring. On the other hand, if something turns out to be 
temporary when it was planned to be permanent, or vice versa, the second 
change in the elemental value is considered to be a significant 
restructuring.
This leads to a related issue which does not appear to be relevant 
to disasters: the documentation of trends. If there is intensified
fund raising, and consequently the organization begins to receive 
increased income, what is the relevant date for the increase in income? 
It seems necessary here to make a judgment call about what is a 
significant change in income. If, for instance, three months after the 
initiation of increased fund raising the organization has raised enough
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money to get itself out of debt, the date for a change in resources is 
assigned to this point as a definable threshold. A gradual increase in 
income is then considered to be the normal state until some significant 
increase or decrease in income occurs. If, however, income begins to 
increase almost immediately after intensifying efforts and does not make 
any discontinuous leaps, the restructuring of resources is said to occur 
at this early point. Future gradual and continuous increases again are 
considered to be part of a normal state.
Take a slightly different example of radicalizing protest 
activities. If the protests of 1963, for example, are noticably more 
radical than the protests of 1962, an empirically justifiable date in 
1963 is used as the relevant date for this change. After this date, if 
there is no evidence that there was another great burst of increased 
radicalization at a later date and there is no reason to suspect that 
they became less radical, radicalization of activities is considered to 
be an extant and continuous aspect of activities which needs no further 
discussion. Since radicalization is noted and a change to less radical 
behavior is not in evidence, it is assumed that progressive 
radicalization of protests continues until a subsequent restructuring 
denotes a significant leap, either positively or negatively, in the 
degree of radical activities.
Any single element change or any elemental change that is seen as a 
threshold mark of a trend, then, is assigned a single date according to 
the above criteria. This appears to be relatively unproblematic as long 
as the researcher and the reader recall that trends are considered to 
be a component of a normal, though not static, state. Once an 
element takes on a value it is assumed to maintain that value until the
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end of the prearranged duration of the value or until it is specifically 
overruled by a new value of the element. Restructurings signify 
discontinuous changes while trends point to continuous change (Wallace, 
1983:144). A trend must be initiated and terminated by a restructuring: 
such a restructuring can document an extant trend which has crossed the 
threshold of observability, or it can refer to a sudden dramatic change 
in the element's value. Either way, once documented a trend Is 
assumed to remain in existence until another threshold of observability 
is crossed or an abrupt change occurs.
For the current research Gamson's categories of success also must 
be empirically defined and refined. Gamson's categories consider gains 
in advantages for the constituency and acceptance for the group itself 
as a legitimate spokesman to be appropriate dimensions of success.
Little attention is given in this scheme to very non-material forms of 
success such as consciousness raising. For my research such elusive 
forms of success are not recorded. A case could be made that what CORE 
and SNCC were attempting, with varying intensity throughout their 
histories, was not so much to create formal changes but rather to make 
black Americans overcome their false consciousness. In historical 
research it is very difficult to delineate formal successes accurately. 
To add to this the very ambiguous categories of sub-cranial changes in 
individuals or groups would make this variable hopelessly complex. Also 
the alternative point can be made that if a social movement organization 
is to be considered truly successful, it must gain some concessions from 
its antagonists rather than merely improving its beneficiary's 
subjective perceptions.
Many of the successes coded here are commonly regarded as successes
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of these particular groups. However, there are some successes that may 
appear to be missing from the analysis. Keeping in mind two 
stipulations may make it easier to realize why these apparent gains are 
not considered to be successes of CORE or SNCC. First, the success must 
be directly attributable to the organization itself. Unlike Gamson, who 
does not assume that the protest groups caused the change, I stipulate 
that the group must be involved in activities which directly facilitated 
the success. The group's activities preceding the attainment of some 
form of success are seen as necessary but not necessarily sufficient for 
the success to have occurred. Under this criterion, then, neither CORE 
nor SNCC can be directly tied to a success such as the 1964 Civil Rights 
bill; for although they were active at this time, they were not pushing 
specifically for federal legislation in any direct way. To give them 
credit for this legislation would be to assert that any group in 
existence at the time of sweeping reform is responsible for the relevant 
change. For Gamson's purposes this is applicable, but when analyzing 
groups that existed during the same temporal period it only confuses the 
issue and does not permit analysis of the relative successes of separate 
groups.
Second, in addition to being directly attributable to a group, a 
success must be linked to the broadest level of the organization to be 
considered an organizational success. For instance a success achieved 
by New York CORE working completely without direct assistance or 
authorization by the national office would not be considered a CORE 
success. The activities leading to a success, therefore, must be linked 
through either initiation or support to the national organization if the 
advancement is to be considered a success for the organization itself.
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These stipulations definitely underrepresent the population of successes
that could, in some way, be linked to each organization. At the same
time, though, such restrictions must be implemented so that a single
L\.
level of analysis is maintained throughout the research 
Underrepresentation of successes is assumed to be random so that 
comparisons between groups are valid.
CHAPTER THREE 
A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF CORE AND SNCC
INTRODUCTION OF CENTRAL VARIABLES
Table 2 describes the central variables for the analysis of CORE 
and SNCC and gives marginals for those variables not provided on 
subsequent tables. These include variables that pertain to several 
facets of restructuring, an indication of each restructuring’s linkage 
to relevant successes, and other variables that are primarily 
organizational characteristics. These latter measures refer to 
characteristics of the organizations at the time of each restructuring; 
however, they are not necessarily directly linked to the immediate 
change.
The first two variables --NUMBER OF ELEMENTS and METRIC 
SCORE-- indicate the degree and relative means/ends strain of each 
restructuring. NUMBER OF ELEMENTS indicates how many of the four 
possible elements are changed above a threshold of observable difference 
during the restructuring. As discussed in Chapter One, this involves 
determinations of which elements change and in what order in relation to 
the sixty-four possible configurations (Table 1, p.6).
METRIC SCORE arrays the sixty-four possible FORMS OF RESTRUCTURING 
according to the relative predominance of either means-based or 
ends-based change. The metric (Table 3) is created by weighting the
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TABLE 2 43
Central Variables and Their Measurement
Variable Measurement
Number of Elements
Metric Score
Time to First Element
Total Time 
Related to Success
Year Restructuring Starts 
Conflictual Catalyst
External Catalyst
Relative Size
Relative Income
Number of elements changed during 
restructuring
Score on derived means-ends metric (+7 to -7)
Time (in weeks) from appearance of 
catalyst until change in first 
restructuring element
Time (in weeks) from appearance of 
catalyst until restructuring is completed
Indicates if restructuring is linked either 
causally or temporally to an instance of 
success
Calendar year in which actual 
transformation of elements begins
Distinguishes catalysts involving overt 
conflict from those catalysts that do not 
involve the organization in overt conflict
0 = nonconflictual CORE N=32, SNCC N=29
1 = conflictual CORE N=8, SNCC N=13
Distinguishes catalysts generated within 
the organization from those that involve 
external entities or events
0 = internal CORE N=26, SNCC N=26
1 = external CORE N=14, SNCC N=16
Indicates organizational trend in size 
(membership or staff) at time of each 
restructuring
1 = Decreasing CORE N=7, SNCC N=ll
2 = Maintaining CORE N=22, SNCC N=23
3 = Increasing CORE N=ll, SNCC N=8
Indicates organizational trend in income 
at time of each restructuring
1 = Decreasing CORE N=13, SNCC N=18
2 = Maintaining CORE N=ll, SNCC N=13
3 = Increasing CORE N=16, SNCC N=ll
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Type of Disjunction
Scope of Restructuring
TABLE 2 (CONTINUED)
Delineates whether the change in the
value of the first element is problematic or
smooth
1 = change (nonproblematic)
CORE N=29, SNCC N=29
2 = contingency or intra-element disparity
(problematic) CORE N=ll, SNCC N=13
Specifies spacial parameters of 
organization affected by restructuring
1 = local CORE N=0, SNCC N=5
2 = regional CORE N=17, SNCC N=15
3 = national CORE N=23, SNCC N=22
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TABLE 3
Metric: Means-based versus Ends-based Restructurings
DR DRAT RD
DA DART RT
D TR TRAD AD R
T TA TARD AT A
DTR DTRA DRT DRTA RDT RDTA DRA RDAT RDA RADT RAD
DTA DTAR DAT DATR RTD RTDA DAR RTAD RTA RATD RAT
DT TDR TDRA TRD TRDA ADT ADTO TRA ADRT ADR ARDT ARD
TD TDA TDAR TAD TADR AID ATDR TAR ATRD ATR ARTD ART
+7 +6 +5 +4 +3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
RA
AR
-7
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value of the first restructuring element, and regressively weighting 
each subsequently changing element in a restructuring. Specifically, 
each transformation of either D or T is assigned a plus (+), and each 
change in A or R is given a minus (-). This sign is weighted four times 
for the first changing element (i.e., a change in D or T receives a +4 
as first transforming element, and an A or R is scored -4 if it changes 
first). The second changing element is weighted three times (i.e., +3 
for ends and -3 for means); the third element is weighted twice (+2 or 
-2); and the fourth element is not weighted at all (+1 or -1). For 
example, a T-D-A form receives a score of +5 [i.e.,(+4)+(+3)+(-2)] while 
an A-D restructuring is scored as -1 [i.e .,(-4)+(+3)].
The resulting distribution (Table 3) spans from +7 (pure ends-based 
restructuring) to -7 (pure means-based restructuring). All scores 
falling between these pure forms display some interplay between means 
and ends in the restructuring. The scores falling below the zero 
midpoint are referred to as means-based because the means elements 
change before (or without) a corresponding change in ends. Conversely, 
positive scores point to ends-based change in which changes in the 
collective representations occur before (or without) changes in means. 
Referring back to Chapter One, means-based changes suggest the 
participant as object and greater stability for the organization, while 
ends-based restructuring suggests the participant as actor and greater 
flexibility. The four-element forms falling at the midpoint suggest a 
balancing of means and ends, since neither ends nor means is dominating 
the change.
The next two variables, TIME FROM CATALYST TO FIRST ELEMENT and 
TOTAL TIME of restructuring, are intertwined but distinct measures of
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the time factor in restructuring. TIME FROM CATALYST TO FIRST ELEMENT 
documents the time from the occurrence of an identifiable catalyst until 
the organization responds with the first change in an element. TOTAL 
TIME is simply the time from the catalyst until the last restructuring 
element is in place and the restructuring is considered complete.
SUCCESS indicates whether the restructuring is linked in some 
manner to the achievement of an instance of success, as evidenced in 
either acceptance for the organization as a legitimate spokesman, or the 
gaining of advantages in the form of a common good. Linkages to success 
are rather broadly defined. The linkages include both temporal links 
(meaning the restructuring occurred either immediately before, after, or 
coterminously with the success), and causal links. A link is considered 
to be causal if and only if the restructuring is seen as necessary (but 
not necessarily sufficient) for the success to have occurred for the 
organization, or if the reverse occurs (i.e. the success is a necessary 
(but not sufficient) cause of the restructuring). Due to the small 
number of restructurings that are connected in either sense to one or 
more instances of success, this variable is coded as a dichotomy 
(0=restructuring is not associated with any success, l=restructuring is 
associated with at least one success either temporally or causally). 
SUCCESS simply documents whether or not a restructuring is linked in any 
way to an instance of success. An instance of success can logically be 
linked to anywhere from one to five restructurings (see Codebook, p. ). 
Similarly a specific restructuring can be associated with any number of 
successes. This variable, then, is a general measure of linkages 
between restructurings and successes. It does not distinguish between 
different degrees or types of linkages, and it does not provide a valid
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indication of how many successes a group achieved.
YEAR RESTRUCTURING STARTS codes each restructuring according to the 
calendar year in which the first element change occurs. This 
determination arrays the restructurings chronologically within each 
organization, and allows for comparison of restructurings occurring at 
the same time in different units.
EXTERNAL CATALYST and CONFLICTUAL CATALYST refer to the catalyst 
which precedes each restructuring. It is assumed that some event or 
occurrence precedes and initiates each restructuring; in other words,
there would be no changes if there were no reason to change. The actual 
types of catalysts cover quite a spectrum of occurrences, from ideas, to 
external perceptions of the organization, to the appointment of a key 
individual, to a debate within the group. For comparative purposes the 
catalysts are distinguished on the above mentioned dichotomies: is the
catalyst conflictual or nonconflictual, and is it internal or external. 
To be considered conflictual, a catalyst must evidence overt conflict 
involving the organization (e.g., a quarrel among members or the 
alienation of outside supporters. Something such as a riot that does 
not directly involve CORE or SNCC would be considered nonconflictual in 
this scheme, because although it is a conflictual event, it does not 
involve the organization in question in a directly conflictual 
situation.) The internal/external variable distinguishes those 
restructurings in which the catalyst is confined to events or
participants within the organization, from those in which the catalyst
involves people or situations which are outside the organization. Each
catalyst receives a score on both these variables.
TYPE OF DISJUNCTION refers to the type of change in the first
49
element of the restructuring. As such it is analytically and 
empirically distinct from the catalyst. In Saunders and Kreps' (1986) 
work all initial changes are termed contingencies. In the current work 
the definition for this term has been refined and narrowed, and two 
additional categories are introduced to describe first element changes. 
CONTINGENCY here refers only to those elemental changes where there is a 
problem with the element (e.g., a loss of income, staff not performing 
their jobs). An INTRA-ELEMENT DISPARITY is considered to occur when 
there is disagreement about the new value an element should assume--in 
this case there is more than one value of the element that is seen as 
valid by participants (e.g. Carmichael's gaining the leadership 
position in SNCC through contesting an election, the compromise which 
created two wings in SNCC in 1961). The third form, termed simply 
CHANGE, occurs when the transition to the new value of the first element 
is smooth and non-problematic (e.g. a generally agreed upon change in 
tasks, positive change in resources). For statistical purposes, 
CONTINGENCIES and INTRA-ELEMENT DISPARITIES are combined to achieve a 
simple problematic/non-problematic dichotomy.
SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING refers to the geographic parameters 
affected by the restructuring. Each restructuring is coded as affecting 
either a local (i.e., single state or smaller geographic area), regional 
(i.e., either North or South), or national region. For CORE, this 
distinction is most validly viewed as an organizational variable because 
the scope of the restructurings and the corresponding scope of the 
organization are almost perfectly correlated. For SNCC, however, it is 
a meaningful distinction between individual restructurings.
The final two variables --RELATIVE SIZE and RELATIVE INCOME-- refer
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to the organization at the time of restructuring rather than to the 
restructurings themselves. What these variables refer to is the general 
trend in income and membership (or staff) at the time of a 
restructuring: is it increasing, decreasing, or remaining relatively
constant? While a significant and abrupt change in either of these 
areas constitutes a restructuring of resources, the trend lines of these 
resources do not offer clearly defined restructurings; rather they 
point to normal states in which money or people are gradually changing 
or remaining constant. A gradual change in human or material resources, 
then, is not necessarily a restructuring. The current variable 
distinguishes between those periods in which the normal state for these 
resources is a positive or negative gradual change and those periods in 
which resources are held at a rather constant level.
FREQUENCIES AND PATTERNS OF RESTRUCTURINGS AND SUCCESSES
Table 4 arrays the 64 logically possible forms of restructuring and 
indicates the forms and frequencies which were located in CORE’s and 
SNCC's histories. For both CORE and SNCC the mean metric scores 
indicate a strain toward means-based restructuring. SNCC's mean metric 
score of -2.0 quite emphatically points to this greater emphasis on 
restructuring means, while CORE'S mean of -0.8, although still
displaying a strain toward changes in means, points to a more nearly
balanced history of restructurings. For both organizations the modal 
metric score is -4, indicating that a single element restructuring of 
means (i.e., a change in either R or A) is the most frequent change.
Looking at the actual number of times CORE and SNCC changed the
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value of each element, irrespective of the full configuration of each 
restructuring, it is apparent that the metric is not creating artificial 
distinctions, but is highlighting actual tendencies in the data. For
both CORE and SNCC domain was the least frequently changed 
element--transformed nine times by CORE and in eleven instances by SNCC. 
Tasks were restructured eighteen times by CORE and eleven times by SNCC. 
The most frequently restructured element was resources--twenty-two times 
by CORE and thirty times by SNCC. Activities changed in thirteen 
instances for CORE and sixteen times for SNCC. In sum, CORE changed the 
values of its ends elements twenty-seven times and its means elements 
thirty-five times. SNCC altered ends twenty-two times and means 
forty-six times. These raw data clearly point to the more means-based 
strain of SNCC's restructurings, and the more nearly balanced changes 
undergone by CORE.
CORE restructured tasks much more frequently than SNCC did. SNCC, 
however, invoked pure means-based restructuring (A-R or R-A) more 
frequently than did CORE. From the rest of the distribution shown on 
Table 4, CORE and SNCC appear to be fairly parallel. Therefore it seems 
that the disparity in mean metric scores between the organizations is 
primarily attributable to CORE'S prolific restructuring of tasks and 
SNCC's more frequent introduction of pure means-based restructurings.
In addition, the slightly higher incidence of single element means-based 
restructuring (A or R) by SNCC, and the single instance of pure 
ends-based restructuring (D-T) undertaken by CORE also contribute to the 
disparity in the two means.
The bottom of Table 4 details the portion of logically possible 
forms of restructuring located in CORE’S and SNCC's histories. In both
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cases all possible one-element forms occurred during the relevant 
history. The percentage of total forms that can be empirically located 
in CORE and SNCC decreases drastically with the transition to 
two-element forms. For CORE 67% of these possible forms were 
documented; for SNCC exactly half (50%) of the logically possible 
two-element forms were observed. With regard to three-element forms, 
CORE experienced only 21% of these possible configurations, and SNCC 
displays only 12%. Four-element forms were delineated only in SNCC, and 
even there only 8% of the possible configurations were documented.
What is not clearly stated on Table 4, but which is also very 
relevant, is the portion of total restructurings that one-, two-, 
three-, and four-element forms each contribute. There is a clear 
predominance of one-element forms: 58% of all CORE'S restructurings and
55% of SNCC's are of this very limited degree. Adding two-element forms 
to the single-element totals accounts for 88% of all restructurings in 
each group. The remaining 12% of CORE'S changes are accounted for by 
three-element forms. For SNCC 7% of the remaining restructurings are 
three-element and 5% are four-element configurations. This points to 
the dialectical nature of organization as both process and unit. That 
which exists is always changing, but change is constrained by what 
exists.
Tables 5a and 5b provide chronologies of the restructurings in CORE 
and SNCC. From these tables and Appendix C, it is apparent that 
although I traced the maintenance system state of CORE for twenty-five 
years and of SNCC for only eight years, the two organizations 
restructured approximately the same number of times. While it is 
acknowledged that all possible changes have not been documented, it is
TABLE 5A
CORE--Chronology of Restructurings
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DATE
6/43
6/44
6/45
4/47
6/47
6/48
6/48
6/49
0/50
6/51
1/54
6/54
3/56
9/56
10/57
10/59
2/60
10/60
2/61
5/61
FORM
DT
T
T
A
T
TR
D
T
AR
TRA
RT
R
T
R
TAD
T
ATR
RT
R
A
METRIC
SCORE
+7
+4
+4
-4
+4
+1
+4
+4
-7
-1
-1
-4
+4
-4
+3
+4
-3
-1
-4
-4
SUCCESS
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
DATE
6/61
10/61
10/61
4/62
4/63
6/63
4/64
4/64
6/64
6/64
8/64
10/64
10/64
1/65
6/65
9/65
1/66
3/66
6/66
6/68
FORM
DA
R
RT
ARD
RA
R
A
R
T
AD
R
AD
TR
R
T
A
R
R
DR
RDT
METRIC
SCORE
+1
-4
-1
-5
-7
-4
-4
-4
+4
-1
-4
-1
+1
-4
+4
-4
-4
-4
+1
+1
SUCCESS
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
TABLE 5B
SNCC--Chronology of Restructurings
METRIC METRIC
DATE FORM SCORE SUCCESS DATE FORM SCORE
6/61 RD -1 YES 2/65 T +4
6/61 TR +1 -- 3/65 A -4
7/61 RA -7 -- 5/65 A -4
8/61 DTAR +4 YES 12/65 R -4
9/61 RDAT +1 -- 1/66 D +4
12/61 TR +1 -- 1/66 A -4
2/62 T +4 -- 5/66 RT -1
4/62 R -4 -- 5/66 A -4
4/62 T +l± -- 6/66 D +4
6/62 DR +1 -- 6/66 R -4
10/62 A -4 7/66 AR -7
12/62 R -4 -- 10/66 RD -1
6/63 R -4 YES 11/66 RA -7
9/63 DRA -1 YES 12/66 DR +1
2/64 A -4 -- 2/67 R -4
4/64 AR -7 -- 5/67 RDT +1
5/64 RA -7 YES 7/67 R -4
9/64 R -4 YES 6/68 RT -1
9/64 A -4 -- 7/68 R -4
10/64 R -4 12/68 R -4
10/64 RA -7 6/69 DRT +3
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assumed that additional restructurings occurred randomly throughout the 
organizations' histories, and that the current research has captured a 
comparable portion of the total possible restructurings for both groups. 
CORE, then, displays 40 instances of restructuring in 25 years for a 
mean of 1.60 restructurings per year. SNCC restructured 42 times in 8 
years resulting in a mean annual rate of 5.25 restructurings.
In the years immediately following the transition from origins to 
maintenance (i.e., the initiation of organization as marked by the 
co-presence of all four elements), both CORE and SNCC were more 
ends-based in their restructurings than they were later in their 
histories. For CORE this results in a mean metric score for the 1940's 
of 3.6--a very pronounced ends-based strain. For SNCC this ends-based 
period falls only slightly above the midpoint with a mean of 0.4 for the 
first ten restructurings. For both organizations this orientation 
towards changing the organization’s ends is even more specifically a 
concentrated focus on subsequent changes in the task structure. CORE'S 
period of ends-based restructuring was much more pronounced and longer 
than SNCC's, although both groups clearly show a greater emphasis on 
ends (especially tasks) early in their maintenance system states.
In absolute chronological years, then, this early period of 
ends-based restructurings lasted much longer for CORE than for SNCC--six 
years for CORE compared to a single year for SNCC. In relation to the 
temporal duration of each organization, this disparity between the 
groups diminishes, but does not disappear. For CORE this early 
ends-based phase encompassed 24% of its total temporal history, while 
for SNCC it occupied only 12.5% of the total duration. However, in 
looking at the portion of restructurings ecompassed in this phase, the
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disparity between the two groups virtually disappears. CORE'S focus on 
ends-based changes encompassed its first eight restructurings, or 20% of 
its entire chronology; for SNCC this early period was composed of the 
first ten restructurings, or 23.8% of its total changes. CORE, then, 
spent more years and a larger portion of its total history in initial 
restructurings which focused quite specifically on ends. SNCC underwent 
approximately the same number of restructurings during this phase, but 
its changes occurred in a much shorter absolute and relative time period 
and were less dominated by single changes in ends.
Following this early ends-based sequence, both groups switched to a 
period of strict means-based changes. For SNCC this second phase 
continued uninterrupted for two years (October 1962 through October 
1964). CORE made this transition to a means-based period in 1950; 
however, during the latter half of the 1950's it reverted to another 
series of predominantly ends-based changes. By 1960 CORE once again 
began a means-based series of restructurings, which continued for 
slightly more than four years (February 1960 through April 1964).
Similar to the initial phase of ends-based changes, this major period of 
means-based changes (CORE'S second means-based segment and SNCC's total 
means-based phase) lasted longer in terms of actual chronological years 
for CORE than for SNCC (four years for CORE compared to two years for 
SNCC). Also like the earlier series, this disparity virtually 
disappears when the actual number of relevant restructurings is 
considered--twelve restructurings (30%) for CORE and eleven changes 
(26%) for SNCC).
The final segment of both organizations' histories was composed of 
a mixed series of restructurings. In both cases individual ends-based
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restructurings were interspersed among the more abundant means-based 
changes. For the final mixed segment, the comparability between groups 
is evident in absolute time, but not in the proportion of time or 
restructurings encompassed by this phase. Both CORE and SNCC spent 
approximately four years in this final phase. For SNCC, though, this 
means that 29% of its entire history and 50% of all restructurings 
occurred in this final period, while for CORE only 16% of its total time 
and 30% of its restructurings fell in this mixed period.
In both groups this final period of mixed restructurings coincided 
with decreasing prosperity. These mixed periods were immediately 
preceded by a restructuring which decreased usable resources.
Throughout the rest of this final phase, with the exception of the 
introduction of single key individuals, neither organization underwent 
any positive restructurings of resources. SNCC, then, spent half of its 
history in this period of progressively declining prosperity. CORE, 
however, spent the majority of its life-span in the relatively 
prosperous earlier phases.
In addition to displaying similar, though not identical, patterns 
of restructuring, there are several interesting patterns within 
coterminous time-frames for the two groups. CORE and SNCC existed 
coterminously as organizations from early 1961 until June of 1968. 
(Remember that technically both groups remained in existence until the 
early 1970's, but that significant breaks with their former identities 
as noted by the final restructuring for each group signifies the end of 
the current analysis.) The first similarity is the marked strain toward 
means-based restructurings that prevails throughout the I960's. For 
CORE this is seen in a mean metric score for this decade of -2.1
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(compared to a pre-1960 mean metric score of 1.1 and an overall mean of 
-0.8), while for SNCC it is simply the overall mean metric of -2.0. The 
restructurings of this decade are also relatively frequent. SNCC 
restructured an average of 5.6 times annually during this coterminous 
phase. CORE'S annual average increased from one restructuring per year 
during the 1940's and 1950's to an average of three changes annually 
during the I960's.
Not only is the decade predominated by frequent means-based 
changes, but there is also a similarity in the date of transition from 
the segment of uniformly means-based changes to the phase of mixed 
restructurings --mid-1964 for CORE and the end of 1964 for SNCC. This 
similarity is seen also in the restructuring which immediately preceded 
the transition to the mixed-phase for each group--a restructuring in 
1964 involving a decrease in usable resources.
In addition to the similar dates for the transition from 
means-based changes to a phase of mixed restructurings, the two groups 
remained in this final phase for approximately the same number of years. 
This is striking because a similarity in absolute time is not noted in 
earlier phases. Regardless of the date used for the final demises of 
CORE and SNCC (the late 1960’s as they are traced here or the early 
1970's), they existed for approximately the same amount of time after 
their temporally similar transitions to the period of mixed 
restructurings. Extrapolating from the fact that the earlier common 
phases showed consistency between the number or proportion of 
restructurings encompassed by each segment, it would be hypothesized 
that this final phase would also show such a pattern. However, what is 
apparent here is a consistency in absolute time, not relative
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proportions. This similarity, and the initiation of the mixed phases by 
temporally similar set-backs in resources, might be pointing to the 
importance of external variables and conditions. This, however, leads 
to a level of explanation that cannot be approached in the current 
research. Rather I can only say that CORE and SNCC both entered their 
final phases within less than a year of each other, these final periods 
began following a set-back in resources, and within approximately four 
years both groups had ceased to be viable or effective entities.
The final similarity among temporal parameters involves the 
clustering of successes. The majority of restructurings associated with 
successes for both groups occurred between the summer of 1961 and the 
fall of 1964. On Tables 5a and 5b the columns labeled "Success" 
indicate those restructurings that are linked either temporally or 
causally to at least one instance of success. Using this relatively lax 
criteria six of SNCC's restructurings and thirteen of CORE'S changes are 
considered to be related to successes. Each restructuring can be 
connected in a variety of ways to any number of successes (see 
Codebook). Therefore, the size of the cluster is not necessarily 
indicative of the number of successes associated with it. For instance, 
the cluster of three CORE restructurings between June and October 1964 
is pointing to a single instance of success. However, the preceding 
cluster of six success-connected restructurings depicts multiple 
linkages for each restructuring to a corresponding cluster of five 
successes.
The majority of success-connected restructurings are composed of 
solely temporal links. Several restructurings are linked both 
temporally and causally to an instance of success. In both groups only
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one link is solely causal--meaning that the causally linked 
restructuring and relevant success are separated in time. Most 
success-related restructurings, therefore, are detailing temporal 
connections. In general CORE'S and SNCC's success-related 
restructurings are related by virtue of when they occurred rather than 
by their content. Even most of those restructurings that showed causal 
relationships with an instance of success occurred in close temporal 
proximity to the relevant success.
A portion of the noted clustering of success-related restructurings 
is to be expected since temporal, in addition to causal, links are 
delineated. This clustering of success-related changes, though, is 
reflecting something more--clusters of successes themselves. CORE is 
coded as having achieved eight instances of success, and SNCC is 
considered to have gained four such successes. These successes are not
randomly scattered throughout CORE'S or SNCC's total histories. Rather,
five of CORE'S eight successes occurred between the summer of 1961 and 
the end of 1962. For SNCC this clustering is less pronounced, but even 
here two of its four successes occurred in the summer of 1964. For both
CORE and SNCC, then, the majority of successes occurred during the
means-based phases of the early 1960's.
As is the case with all temporally coterminous similarities in this 
research, it would be mere speculation rather than rigorous science for 
me to attempt to explain this commonality by reference to either the 
effect of similar organizaional configurations or to external events.
As will be seen later, the chronological year in which a restructuring 
takes place is a very central variable with regard to many other 
measures. However, to speculate about the specific influences or
62
conditions of this larger world environment would lead to the type of 
unsubstantiated conjecture that plagues so much of social science.
While it provides an incomplete answer, the current work seeks to remain 
within the limits of what is known rather than to venture into the 
intuitively satisfying but scientifically untenable realm of premature 
explanation and haphazard causal relationships.
Patterns of Sequential Restructurings
Linn (1986) introduced (from Wallace, 1983) the term rhythm to 
describe consistency of forms of restructuring (as seen in metric 
scores) across a sequence of changes. While the term itself is 
imprecise, the patterning that it, in part, points to is important to 
recognize. A search for patterns in exploratory work such as this is an 
attempt to capture an absence of randomness rather than to demand 
absolutely pure forms of pattern. There are several types of patterns 
across subsequent restructurings that are potentially informative to 
detail. The first type is the general pattern across the organization’s 
entire maintenance state. This is most broadly delineated as the 
ends-based, means-based, mixed period sequence detailed above.
The second type of patterning is most closely aligned to what Linn 
termed rhythm--an absolute consistency of metric scores across a 
sequence of two or more restructurings. This consistency is noted in 
both CORE and SNCC in several series. Referring back to Tables 5a and 
5b, CORE displays seven such chains, and SNCC shows six sequences of 
identical adjacent metric scores. The majority of such chains involve 
only two restructurings, and none continue for more than three 
consecutive changes. It is difficult to interpret these short chains of 
consistency within the longer chains comprising the organizations’
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histories. SNCC's chronology suggests that a phase of means-based 
changes shows most rhythm, while a period of ends-based change is least 
rhythmic. For CORE this same pattern is evident but it is much less 
clear. Here three of the seven chains occur in means-based phases, with 
two chains in the ends-based periods and two in the final mixed phase.
In general it could be concluded that, in Linn's definition of the term, 
means-based phases tend to be most rhythmic.
Given the posited value of interplay between means-based and 
ends-based restructuring during an organization's history, rhythm in the 
above sense would theoretically be a detrimental patterning. Unless the 
rhythm involves a series of four-element forms which fall at the 
mid-point of the metric, such patterning points to a repetitive focus on 
changes of either ends or means. This is clearly seen in CORE and SNCC 
where the majority of rhythmic chains are composed of series of either 
-4 or +4. These scores point more toward a pure form of either 
means-based or ends-based restructurings than to the balanced mid-point.
Since both groups show approximately the same number of these short 
rhythmic chains, the relationship between rhythm and longevity appears 
to be negligible. The value, or debility, in terms of success is not 
clear. In general successes were achieved during means-based phases of 
restructuring, and these means-based periods tend to be most rhythmic. 
For SNCC three of its six success-related restructurings are members of 
rhythmic chains. CORE, though, has only one of its success-related 
changes involved in such a chain. In fact most successes were achieved 
during CORE’S non-rhythmic segment of its primary means-based period.
In terms of extended periods, then, phases encompassing more rhythm tend 
to be associated with success. With regard to individual
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restructurings, though, the majority of rhythmic restructurings are not 
associated with successes and at best only half of all success-related 
restructurings are involved in rhythmic chains. From this it appears 
that while periods of means-based changes are associated with success, 
absolute rhythm is neither beneficial nor detrimental to either the 
organization's viability or its attainment of success.
A patterned mixture of means and ends is another potentially 
important form of patterning. If rhythm should theoretically be 
detrimental to an organization, a mixed pattern should provide the 
needed dialectical interplay between ends and means. Overall the 
average metric scores point to a greater interplay between means and 
ends for CORE than for SNCC. This is not capturing the exact patterning 
among adjacent changes, but it appears that overall balance may be 
associated with longevity. Balance could also be associated with 
success since CORE was more balanced and more successful than SNCC. As 
another component of this, it is noted that CORE'S period of most 
concentrated successes (i.e., the means-based phase of the early 1960s) 
included one ends-based restructuring compared to SNCC's strictly 
means-based phase, pointing to a slightly, although perhaps negligibly, 
more balanced period. Overall balance, then, may be associated with 
both longevity and success.
Within these complete histories, however, it was during a 
strongly means-based period, not a mixed phase that most successes were 
achieved. The final phase when means and ends were most pointedly and 
consistently interspersed was also the time of disintegration for both 
groups. This is not to say, necessarily, that an intermingling of 
means and ends is detrimental. It seems more accurate to point to the
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commencement of decline before the organizations began these phases.
The content of these changes in the final period may also be important 
in understanding this final period.
The value of any type of patterning is not clear in this small 
number of cases and these short patterned chains. Rhythm (indicated by 
consistent metric scores on adjacent changes) appears to be associated 
with means-based and successful periods, but not necessarily with 
success-related restructurings. Overall balance is associated with 
longevity and greater success, but again it is restructurings during the 
unbalanced periods which are specifically related to successes. Rhythm 
occurs most pointedly during periods of prosperity while balance is 
associated with the final declining phase. This is opposite of the 
hypothesized value of the dialectical relationship between means and 
ends. However, it fits quite closely Starbuck's (1983) view of 
organizations as propelled by inertia when things are going well and 
questioning their ends only when an unignorable problem arises.
Timing of Restructurings
CORE and SNCC restructured approximately the same number of times 
during their relevant histories. Since SNCC existed for a much shorter 
time than CORE, it logically follows that it restructured much more 
frequently in its given time-frame. From the first columns in Tables 6a 
and 6b it is possible to fully grasp this disparity. Comparing the 
dates of subsequent restructurings provides a measure of the intervening 
time between the commencement of one restructuring and the next. CORE'S 
history displays an average intervening time of over ten months between 
the early restructurings in the ends-based phase. This time between 
restructurings drops drastically with the onset of the 1960's. During
TABLE 6A
CORE--Chronology of Restructurings and Timing of Elements 
(Time Expressed in Weeks)
Date Form
Time From 
Catalyst 
To First 
Element
Time From 
First To 
Last Element
Time Fn 
Catalys 
To Last 
Element
6/43 DT XX 0 XX
6/44 T XX XX
6/45 T 52 52
4/47 A 40 40
6/47 T 260 260
6/48 TR 52 0 52
6/48 D 20 20
6/49 T XX XX
0/50 AR XX XX XX
6/51 TRA 104 0 104
1/54 RT 52 0 52
6/54 R 156 156
3/56 T XX XX
9/56 R XX XX
10/57 TAD 16 116 132
10/59 T 104 104
2/60 ATR 2 20 22
10/60 RT 32 8 40
2/61 R 16 16
5/61 A 20 20
6/61 DA 12 28 40
10/61 R 0 0
10/61 RT 20 52 72
4/62 ARD 36 76 112
4/63 RA 0 8 8
6/63 R 0 0
4/64 A 36 36
4/64 R XX XX
6/64 T XX XX
6/64 AD 0 52 52
8/64 R 16 16
10/64 AD 8 3 11
10/64 TR 8 12 20
1/65 R 36 36
6/65 T 104 104
9/65 A 0 0
1/66 R 4 4
3/66 R 8 8
6/66 DR 3 0 3
6/68 RDT 52 12 64
XX = Uncertain 
-- «= Not Applicable
TABLE 6B
SNCC--Chronology of Restructurings and Timing of Elements 
(Time Expressed in Weeks)
Time From Time From
Catalyst Time From Catalyst
To First First To To Last
Date Form Element Last Element Element
6/61 RD 32 0 32
6/61 TR XX XX XX
7/61 RA 0 4 4
8/61 DTAR 8 5 13
9/61 RDAT 4 8 4
12/61 TR 12 19 31
2/62 T 64 64
4/62 R XX XX
4/62 T 0 0
6/62 DR 0 24 24
10/62 A 0 0
12/62 R 24 24
6/63 R XX XX
9/63 DRA 0 10 10
2/64 A 12 12
4/64 AR 12 3 15
5/64 RA 20 4 24
9/64 R 0 0
9/64 A 3 3
10/64 R 8 8
10/64 RA 6 12 18
2/65 T 0 0
3/65 A 2 2
5/65 A 16 16
12/65 R XX XX
1/66 D 0 0
1/66 A 24 24
5/66 RT 0 0 0
5/66 A XX XX
6/66 D 0 0
6/66 R 6 6
7/66 AR 12 12 24
10/66 RD 16 0 16
11/66 RA 20 0 20
12/66 DR 12 20 32
2/67 R 4 4
5/67 RDT 16 0 16
7/67 R 0 0
6/68 RT 16 0 16
7/68 R 1 1
12/68 R 0 0
6/69 DRT 0 4 4
XX = Uncertain 
-- = Not Applicable
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the means-based phase early in this decade, CORE restructured on an 
average of once every 4.5 months. In the final mixed phase the average 
intervening period between the onset of subsequent restructurings was 
even slightly less (an average of 4.3 months).
SNCC began its history by averaging a new restructuring every 1.3 
months during its ends-based phase. This rapid initiation of new 
restructurings slowed down slightly during its later phases to average 
one change every 2.4 months in the means-based period and a change every 
2.6 months in the final mixed phase. The 1960s were a time of very 
frequent restructurings, then, for both CORE and SNCC. CORE, however, 
never restructured as quickly in succession as SNCC. An interesting 
disparity between the two groups here is that as CORE progressed though 
the stages from predominantly ends-based, to means-based, to mixed 
restructurings its changes occurred with progressive frequency. For 
SNCC, though, each subsequent period included a slight decrease in the 
frequency of restructuring.
SNCC restructured much more frequently than CORE: it also
restructured much more quickly. The mean time for CORE restructurings 
from the appearance of a catalyst until the last restructuring element 
was in place was 51.75 weeks (median=38 weeks). For SNCC the comparable 
mean was 12.73 weeks (median=10 weeks). The disparity in total time is 
not a result of first element lag, for in the actual time of 
restructuring (the time from the change in the first element to the 
change in the last restructuring element) the vast disparity is still 
apparent: 24 weeks for CORE compared to 6.7 weeks for SNCC.
Comparable disparities between the mean total time are evident in 
every period of the organizations' histories, as is a common trend of
69
later restructurings being completed much more quickly. During the 
initial ends-based periods, CORE’S mean total time of restructuring was 
approximately 85 weeks, while SNCC's comparable mean was 22 weeks. The 
means-based phase encompassed changes that took an average of 33 weeks 
for CORE to complete and 11 weeks for SNCC. Finally in the mixed phase, 
both organizations experienced their fastest overall restructurings--29 
weeks for CORE and slightly under 10 weeks for SNCC. In general, then, 
both organizations restructured much more quickly later in their 
histories. SNCC always restructured more quickly than CORE. Across the 
comparable periods this disparity between the groups persists, and even 
in its fastest period, CORE did not complete restructurings as quickly
as SNCC did in its slowest phase.
Due to the tremendous difference in the average number of
restructurings per year, this disparity between the two groups in total
time may appear to be a foregone conclusion. This is not necessarily 
the case. Since restructurings can overlap temporally, the more 
frequent SNCC restructurings could be arranged in a muddled 
configuration of overlapping restructurings with relevant "normal" 
states being discernible only with respect to a particular 
restructuring. This is not what is occurring in SNCC, though. Rather 
the relatively linear arrangement of restructurings is maintained with 
the restructuring process just occurring much more quickly and with 
shorter time periods between restructurings.
CORRELATIONS AMONG CENTRAL VARIABLES
The following section will provide a discussion of the
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relationships among the central variables. First, the correlations 
common to both organizations will be outlined, followed by additional 
relationships which are unique to CORE and SNCC, respectively. 
Correlations involving changes in each specific element will complete 
this chapter. A comparison of current findings to disaster-related 
findings using Kreps1 model and a synthesis of the findings on CORE and 
SNCC will follow in Chapter Four.
All correlations discussed in the following sections surpass a 
criterion of significance at the 0.1 level. This is a rather loose 
criterion for inclusion in rigorous statistical analysis; however, the 
current work is an exploratory undertaking which seeks to illuminate 
potential patterns and directions of relationships rather than a rigidly 
structured testing of extant hypotheses. So, while such an inclusive 
level of significance may allow relatively weak relationships to enter 
the study, it is better at this point to bring these possible 
relationships to light so that they can be more rigorously tested in 
future research, than to eliminate potentially meaningful relationships 
at this preliminary stage.
Common Correlations for Both CORE and SNCC
As seen on Tables 7a and 7b, TOTAL TIME is negatively related to 
the YEAR RESTRUCTURING STARTS (CORE r— .45, SNCC r=-.32). Earlier 
restructurings take longer to complete and later ones are completed much 
more quickly. As discussed above, restructurings during the 1960's for 
CORE were much shorter than those that occur prior to 1960. It is quite 
possible that something about the general environment of the 1960's 
promoted faster restructurings. If this is the case, it is an 
interesting finding, and corresponds to the previously discussed finding
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TABLE 7A
CORE--Correlation Coefficients and Levels of Significanc e
Number
of
Elements
Metric
Score
Time To 
First 
Element
Total
Time
Related
to
Success
Number of 
Elements
1.000 .001
(.496)
- .145 
(.214)
.139
(.224)
.216 
(.091)
Metric Score 1.000 .406
(.011)
.446
(.005)
- .076 
(.319)
Time to 
First Element
1.000 .888 
(.000)
- . 248 
(.085)
Total Time 1.000 - .003 
(.494)
Related to 
Success 1.000
Year
Re s true tur ing 
Starts
.062
(.353)
- .428 
(.003)
- .498 
(.002)
- .446 
(.005)
.139
(.196)
Conflictual
Catalyst
- .213 
(.094)
- .075 
(.323)
- .130 
(.240)
- .237 
(.096)
- .214 
(.093)
External
Catalyst
.097
(.277)
- .320 
(.022)
- .337 
(.029)
- .369 
(.019)
.050
(.379)
Relative Size - .064 
(.347)
- .263 
(.050)
- .365 
(.020)
- .267 
(.070)
.378 
(.008)
Relative
Income
.098
(.273)
- .124 
(.222)
.060
(.371)
.182
(.139)
.316
(.023)
Type of 
Disjunction
- .083 
(.305)
- .379 
(.008)
- .047 
(.398)
- .077 
(.337)
- .188 
(.122)
Scope of 
Restructuring
.097
(.276)
- .275 
(.043)
- .535 
(.001)
- .454 
(.005)
.165
(.155)
Mean 
Std Dev
1.550
.714
7.175
3.727
39.656
54.984
51.750
56.401
. 325 
.474
TABLE 7B
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SNCC- -Correlation Coefficients and Levels of SignifL
Number
of
Elements
Metric
Score
Time To 
First 
Element
Total
Time
Number of 
Elements
1.000 .267
(.044)
- .027 
(.437)
.146
(.194)
Metric Score 1.000 .029
(.432)
.070
(.341)
Time to 
First Element
1.000 .887 
(.000)
Total Time 1.000
Related to 
Success
Year
Restructuring
Starts
- .195 
(.108)
- .111 
(.243)
- .206 
(.111)
- .315 
(.029)
Conflictual 
Catalyst
- .129 
(.207)
- .064 
(.344)
- .172 
(.154)
- .206 
(•111)
External
Catalyst
- .054 
(.366)
.122
(.221)
- .128 
(.226)
- .185 
(.136)
Relative Size .125
(.216)
.069
(.331)
- .038 
(.411)
.009
(.479)
Relative
Income
.084
(.299)
- .102 
(.260)
.012
(.471)
.085
(.309)
Type of 
Disjunction
.060
(.353)
- .225 
(.076)
- .123 
(.235)
- .072 
(.335)
Scope of
Re s true tur ing
- .022 
(.445)
.184
(.122)
- .215 
(.101)
- .152 
(.185)
Mean 
Std Dev
1.619
.825
5.952
3.568
9.460
12.639
12.730
13.541
Related
to
Success
.274 
(.039)
- .014 
(.465)
.080
(.318)
.091
(.296)
1.000
- .317 
(.020)
- .273
(.040)
. 100 
(.264)
.451
(.001)
.502
(.000)
- .126 
(.213)
- .140 
(.188)
.143
.354
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that SNCC's average time of restructuring was much shorter than CORE'S. 
There appears to be a bit more to this relationship than a simple 
response to external factors, because SNCC, whose entire life history 
was contained in the 1960's, also exhibits this same trend. If it were 
just that the 1960's were a time of rapid change, we would expect the 
disparity between the two groups' means, but would not^expect SNCC to 
show a significant decrease in time of restructuring throughout its 
history.
METRIC SCORE is negatively related to the TYPE OF DISJUNCTION (CORE 
r=-.38, SNCC r=-.22). The more problematic the change in the first 
element, the lower the metric score. Keep in mind that a problematic 
first element can entail a sudden problem with an element or can refer 
to a disagreement about the element's potential new form. This 
relationship is much stronger for CORE than for SNCC. The mean metric 
score for a restructuring with a nonproblematic first element for CORE 
is 0.0, while those with problematic disjunctions average only -3.1 on 
the metric. For SNCC nonproblematic disjunctions show an average metric 
score of -1.5 while restructurings with problematic disjunctions have a 
mean of -3.2. A problematic change in the first element occurred more 
frequently in changes of activities or resources than in domains or 
tasks. While 31% of SNCC's restructurings with problematic disjunctions 
and 44% of CORE'S involved changes in the ends elements (i.e., D or T), 
in the vast majority of problematic disjunctions, the problematic 
first-element change itself involved either A or R. A sudden problem 
with an element, the most common type of problematic disjunction, occurs 
more frequently in an organization's means than its ends.
A restructuring's relationship to SUCCESS is positively correlated
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with the NUMBER OF ELEMENTS (CORE r=.22, SNCC r=.27). More complete 
restructurings are more likely to be linked to an instance of success 
than are those that are less complete. Since only thirteen 
restructurings for CORE and six for SNCC are linked to at least one 
instance of success, any statistical relationship involving these few 
cases must be viewed very tentatively. Similar to the overall 
distribution, the majority of success-related restructurings involve 
changes in only one or two elements. However, one-element forms are 
significantly under-represented in success-related restructurings 
compared to their overall frequency. For CORE one-element forms account 
for 58% of all restructurings but for only 38% of success-related 
changes. Similarly for SNCC, 55% of all restructurings but only 33% of 
success-related changes consist of a change in a single element. For 
CORE this under-representation of one-element forms is compensated for 
by an over-representation of two-element changes, while success-related 
three-element forms occur in comparable proportion to their overall 
incidence. SNCC's two-element forms account for 33% of both total and 
success-related changes, but both three- and four-element forms are 
significantly over-represented in the success-related restructurings.
The few extensive changes combined with the small number of 
success-related restructurings makes definite statistical assertions 
impossible. At this initial step in the exploration of social movement 
organizations, however, it appears that changes in more than one element 
are more likely than single element changes to be related to success.
A CONFLICTUAL CATALYST is less likely to be associated with SUCCESS 
than a nonconflictual one (CORE r=-.21, SNCC r=-.27). For CORE only one 
of the thirteen restructurings associated with success sprang from a
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conflictual catalyst, while none of SNCC's six success-related 
restructurings started from a conflictual catalyst. While it is true 
that successes occurred during the time in the organizations' histories 
when they were experiencing less conflictual catalysts, it is also true 
that in periods encompassing both conflictual and nonconflictual 
catalysts, linkages to success are conspicuously absent for conflictual 
catalyst restructurings. In short, changes that arise as a response to 
overt conflict are less likely than their non-conflictual counterparts 
to be associated with success.
RELATIVE SIZE and RELATIVE INCOME are both positively related to
SUCCESS (CORE size r=.38, income r=.32; SNCC size r=.45, income r=.50).
Recall that these variables are referring to trends in the organization
at the time of the restructuring rather than to specific changes in the
immediate restructuring. It is not so much that restructurings
occurring during periods of increasing trends in income and size are
more likely to be associated with success than those occurring during
stable phases of resources. Rather this correlation is pointing to the
virtual absence of success-related restructurings when size and income
are decreasing. Because most linkages between restructurings and
successes are at least in part temporal, this points again to the
relatively prosperous means-based period of restructurings in the early
1960's as the prime era for the achievement of successes. Once again
this is only descriptive; evaluating the independent contributions of
prosperity and broader effects of specific time frames can come only
5
with more research on temporally disparate groups
Appendix C depicts all correlations between the twelve central 
variables. Looking only at the relationships among the seven variables
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whose intercorrelations are not presented on Tables 7a and 7b, the 
following common relationships are apparent. YEAR THE RESTRUCTURING 
STARTS is significantly correlated with all of these variables except 
EXTERNAL CATALYST. For both CORE and SNCC it is positively correlated 
with CONFLICTUAL CATALYST, TYPE OF DISJUNCTION, and SCOPE OF THE 
RESTRUCTURING. The later the restructuring occurs, therefore, the more 
likely it has a conflictual catalyst, a problematic change in the first 
element and affects a broader scope.
The correlations relating YEAR THE RESTRUCTURING STARTS with 
CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS and TYPE OF DISJUNCTION are much higher for SNCC 
than they are for CORE (CORE: conflictual catalyst r=.30, type of
disjunction r=.28; SNCC: conflictual catalyst r=.53, type of
disjunction r=.42). Before the comparable cutting points in 1964 (i.e., 
the onset of the final mixed phase) both CORE and SNCC had relatively 
few conflictual catalysts. During this early period only 11% of CORE's 
restructurings were started by a conflictual catalyst, and only 5% of 
SNCC's changes were connected to such catalysts. In their later years, 
though, the portion of restructurings set off by conflictual catalysts 
increased dramatically. In this final phase, 31% of CORE'S changes and 
fully 52% of SNCC's restructurings were preceded by conflictual 
catalysts. In both groups, then, later restructurings were much more 
frequently carried out as responses to a disputive environment than were 
early changes.
A similar pattern is evident with regard to disjunctions.
Twenty-two percent of CORE's restructurings before April 1964 involved a 
problematic change in the first element. In the final period, this 
percentage increased to include 38% of all changes. For SNCC only 5% of
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its pre-October 1964 changes involved a problematic transition in the 
first element. After this date, though, fully 52% of SNCC's 
restructurings involved either a sudden problem in an element or a 
disagreement over an element's new value. Both groups, then, 
experienced significant increases in the proportion of restructurings 
involving conflictual catalysts and/or problematic disjunctions during 
their final years.
SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING is correlated with YEAR THE 
RESTRUCTURING STARTS much more strongly for CORE than for SNCC (CORE 
r=.79, SNCC r=.34). The later the year the broader the geographic scope 
affected by the restructurings. For CORE this means that later 
restructurings quite consistently affected the entire organization, 
while for SNCC some local and regional restructurings were interspersed 
among its later changes. For CORE the correlation between SCOPE OF THE 
RESTRUCTURING and SCOPE OF THE ORGANIZATION is so high that the former 
becomes an artifactual variable which does not discriminate among 
individual restructurings within a given time-frame. For SNCC there is 
enough fluctuation in the SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING with respect to the 
organization's scope during various periods, that the former delineates 
meaningful distinctions between unique restructurings.
RELATIVE INCOME is negatively correlated with YEAR THE 
RESTRUCTURING STARTS for both CORE and SNCC (CORE r=-.25, SNCC r=-.67).
A later year is associated with a decreasing trend in income. The fact
that this correlation is stronger for SNCC is a reflection of SNCC's
overall shorter history. It will be recalled that a negative trend in
income began in mid-1964 for CORE and in late-1964 for SNCC. CORE's
temporal mid-point fell in the mid-1950's; therefore, its relatively
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later period encompassed a period of economic growth and maintenance as 
well as its final decline. With SNCC's shorter total history, the 
transition from relative prosperity to progressive impoverishment 
coincided with its temporal mid-point. Therefore for SNCC, "later" 
points to a time when income was steadily decreasing. For CORE "later" 
covers a much longer time which encompassed both positive and negative 
trends in monetary resources.
Although RELATIVE SIZE is significantly correlated with YEAR THE 
RESTRUCTURING STARTS for both CORE and SNCC, the relationship is in 
opposite directions. For CORE later restructurings are associated with 
periods of higher relative size (r=.24), while for SNCC later changes 
occurred during phases of decreasing size (r=-.70). This again is a 
reflection of the very different durations of the two organizations' 
histories. After the relevant dates in 1964 the size of both CORE and 
SNCC never again increased. For both groups, though, size is considered 
to remain relatively constant until the adoption of Black Power in 1966. 
For CORE, then, the long period of very slow growth at the beginning of 
its history coupled with the tremendous growth in the early sixties (a 
part of CORE's "later" history) and the rather late date for an actual 
decline in size, work together to create a slightly positive 
correlation. SNCC's increasing size fairly early in its history 
combined with the pattern of constancy and then decline in its later 
history create a significant negative relationship. It is also 
important here that SNCC has more restructurings recorded in the 
post-1966 period, and therefore this period of decline for both 
organizations is more evident in SNCC's correlations.
A CONFLICTUAL CATALYST is negatively correlated with RELATIVE
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INCOME and positively related to TYPE OF DISJUNCTION for both CORE and 
SNCC (CORE: relative income r=-.26, type of disjunction r=.25; SNCC:
relative income r=-.43, type of disjunction r=.44). As income decreased 
conflictual catalysts increased, and problematic disjunctions were more 
frequently associated with conflictual catalysts than were 
nonproblematic disjunctions.
This relationship with RELATIVE INCOME is reflecting a significant 
increase in conflictual catalysts as size decreased rather than a 
reduction of conflictual catalysts while size was increasing. In both 
CORE and SNCC a decrease in income preceded an increase in conflictual 
catalysts. The lack of a significant relationship between EXTERNAL 
CATALYST and RELATIVE INCOME for SNCC shows that the conflict was not 
predominantly internal or external, but rather that it increased on all 
fronts with decreasing income. For CORE, there is a slight (though not 
significant) negative relationship between EXTERNAL CATALYSTS and 
RELATIVE INCOME and a significant negative relationship between 
CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS and EXTERNAL CATALYSTS (r— .24) indicating that as 
income decreased, catalysts became slightly more externally generated; 
however, the conflictual catalysts remained exclusively internally 
generated. Therefore, as income decreased (i.e., during the final 
period of mixed restructurings beginning in 1964), both CORE and SNCC 
experienced an increase in conflictual catalysts. However, for CORE 
these conflictual catalysts remained internally generated, while for 
SNCC conflictual antecedents to change arose in both the internal and 
external environment.
For SNCC the relationship between CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS and 
PROBLEMATIC DISJUNCTIONS is very straight forward: conflictual
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catalysts are more frequently associated with problematic disjunctions 
than nonconflictual catalysts, and the majority of conflictual catalysts 
are followed by problematic disjunctions. For CORE, though, the 
relationship is not so obvious. Most problematic disjunctions are 
associated with conflictual catalysts, but fully half of the conflictual 
catalysts are associated with nonproblematic disjunctions. In short, if 
a restructuring is known to have a problematic first element, it can 
logically be retrospectively surmised that the restructuring had a 
conflictual catalyst. However, if a restructuring has a conflictual 
catalyst, there is no reason to assume that it will have a problematic 
disjunction.
RELATIVE INCOME and RELATIVE SIZE are positively related (CORE 
r=.48, SNCC r=.68). In both CORE and SNCC an increase or a decrease in 
income precedes the corresponding change in size, indicating that these 
organizations did not gain income because they were large or lose income 
because of a waning constituency. Rather their human resources began 
trends that mimicked extant trends in material resources.
In sum, the following correlations hold for both CORE and SNCC. 
Earlier restructurings are completed much more quickly than later 
restructurings. Such early changes also arise from less conflictual 
catalysts, rarely involve problematic changes in the first element, and 
are enveloped by periods of relative financial prosperity. Changes 
which spring from conflictual catalysts are more likely to occur in 
periods of decreasing income and to involve a problematic change in the 
first restructuring element. These restructurings with problematic 
disjunctions, in turn, exhibit a pronounced means-based strain. Trends 
in the organization's size tend to mimic extant trends in income.
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Restructurings occurring while these trends in resources are decreasing 
are least likely to be associated with successes. Additionally, 
success-related restructurings tend to arise from nonconflictual 
catalysts and to involve more elements.
CORE’s Unique Correlations
In addition to the common correlations above, CORE and SNCC each 
display some unique relationships among the variables. The following 
section highlights relationships among the variables which appear only 
for CORE. METRIC SCORE is positively correlated with both TIME TO FIRST 
ELEMENT (r=.41) and TOTAL TIME (r=.45). For those changes that took 
longer than the mean total time to complete, the average metric score 
was 0.6. Restructurings completed faster than the mean time averaged a 
metric score of -2.6. Although longer time is associated with earlier 
restructurings (r=-.45) and a higher metric score is also related to 
earlier restructurings (r=-.43), this relationship between time and 
metric score is not merely an artifact of YEAR THE RESTRUCTURING STARTS. 
The relationship is just as obvious after April 1964, when everything 
was happening much more quickly. For this later period restructurings 
taking longer than the mean time show an average metric score of 1.6, 
while those restructrings faster than average exhibit a mean metric 
score of -2.4. Regardless of when the restructuring occurs within 
the organization's chronology, ends-based restructuring takes time. 
Conversely, at least for CORE, means-based restructurings enhanced 
speed.
EXTERNAL CATALYSTS are negatively related to the METRIC SCORE 
(r-.32) and the time measures (TIME TO FIRST ELEMENT r— .34, TOTAL TIME 
r=-.37). This makes sense since it is saying that internal catalysts
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tend to produce restructurings that take longer and, as noted before, 
longer restructurings tend to have higher metric scores. Internal 
catalysts initiated restructurings with a mean metric score of 0.5, 
while external catalysts led to changes averaging -2.4 on the metric. 
Again this is not merely an artifact of the year, for after April 1964 
internal catalyst restructurings averaged -0.3 while externally 
initiated ones display a mean metric score of only -2.2. With relation 
to time, restructurings begun by internal catalysts took an average of 
52 weeks to complete (36 after April 1964), while external catalysts 
were answered by restructurings that took only 21.7 weeks (20.4 weeks 
after April 1964). Changes in response to external catalysts, then, 
are more means-based and are completed much more quickly than their 
internally generated counterparts.
RELATIVE SIZE also is negatively related to METRIC SCORE (r=-.26) 
and the time measures (TIME TO FIRST ELEMENT r=-.36, TOTAL TIME r=-.27). 
The average metric score is -3.3 for restructurings occurring while size 
was increasing, whereas the average metric score for restructurings that 
occurred while size was decreasing or maintaining is 0.1. During times 
of flourishing membership, CORE restructured primarily within relatively 
fixed ends and focused its transformations on its activities and 
resources. It is when the trend in membership was either static or 
declining that CORE brought its domain and task structure more pointedly 
into question.
Restructurings that occurred while size was increasing took an 
average of only 33.3 weeks to complete; those occurring while size was 
maintaining were completed in 56.9 weeks; and during periods of 
decreasing size the average length of restructuring was 75.8 weeks.
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Overall this is saying that restructurings were completed much faster in 
the early 1960's than at any other time in CORE's history. The 
disparity between the strengths of the correlations with TIME TO FIRST 
ELEMENT and TOTAL TIME indicates that it was the reaction time from the 
catalyst to the onset of restructuring more than the actual time to 
transform the elements once restucturing began that was most severely 
affected by the relative size. As size increased CORE reacted more 
readily to the relevant catalysts than it did while size was decreasing 
or maintaining. In short, CORE restructured its elements more quickly 
in the early 1960's, but these correlations also show that a significant 
part of the decrease in total time was a result of more immediate 
reaction to appearing catalysts.
SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING is also negatively related to the METRIC 
SCORE (r=-.28) and the time measures (TIME TO FIRST ELEMENT r=-.54,
TOTAL TIME r=-.45). Remember that for CORE the SCOPE OF THE 
RESTRUCTURING is regarded as an organizational rather than restructuring
variable. Therefore this is just reaffirming that earlier
restructurings have higher metric scores and take longer to complete. 
Again the disparity within the correlations for the time measures 
indicates that relevant catalysts were not responded to as quickly early
in CORE's history as they were in later years.
In addition to these unique correlations for CORE seen in Table 7a, 
Appendix C shows two additional relationships. CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS 
are negatively correlated with EXTERNAL CATALYSTS (r=-.24) and 
positively with SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING (r=.30). Since SCOPE OF THE 
RESTRUCTURING is basically an organizational variable, this is stating 
that conflictual catalysts occurred later in CORE's history.
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The relationship between CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS and EXTERNAL 
CATALYSTS was discussed briefly above. Internal catalysts were more 
likely to be conflictual than were external ones. Overall only 20% of 
all CORE's catalysts were conflictual. Twenty-three percent of all 
CORE's internal catalysts were conflictual, while only seven percent of 
the external catalysts can be classified as involving conflict. CORE's 
later restructurings were more frequently in response to conflictual 
catalysts than its earlier changes, but even here CORE is changing in 
response to internal conflict rather than to disputes involving the 
external environment. Since unanswered catalysts do not formally enter 
this study, it is difficult at this point to say if CORE actually 
experienced very few conflicts with the broader social world, or if it 
did encounter many of these externally conflictual episodes but did not 
readjust its organizational configuration in response to these disputes.
In addition to the correlations shared with SNCC, then, CORE 
displays the following relationships. Means-based restructurings are 
completed more quickly than ends-based changes. A trend of increasing 
size, a larger score of the restructuring, and an external catalyst are 
all associated with these relatively quick means-based changes. Finally 
conflictual catalysts most frequently are generated within the 
organization and occur later in the group's history.
SNCC's Unique Correlations
SNCC displays fewer unique correlations than CORE. METRIC SCORE is 
positively related to the NUMBER OF ELEMENTS (r=.27). Similar to the 
effect noted in the relationship between NUMBER OF ELEMENTS and SUCCESS, 
this correlation is statistically created due to an outlier effect. For 
one-element forms of restructuring, the mean metric score is -2.3, and
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for two-element forms it is -3.0. In contrast, three-element forms show 
a mean metric score of 1.0 and four-element forms average 2.5 on the 
derived metric. For the majority of the cases (i.e., those involving 
one or two elements), the larger the number of elements, the lower the 
metric score. By including all restructurings, though, the drastic 
disparity between the mean metric scores for one- and two-element forms 
compared to three- and four-element changes points to a slight 
correspondence between extensive changes and ends-based strains.
Although the statistical finding is partly artificial with this sample, 
the fact that it is such a dramatic difference warrants its inclusion in 
the findings. Perhaps a sample with more three- and four-element forms 
will provide a normal distribution which could clarify this point.
Later restructurings are less apt to be related to successes 
(r=-.32). The six restructurings associated with successes occurred 
during the first three years, or eighteen restructurings, of SNCC's 
history. This also makes sense because SUCCESS is additionally 
correlated with other variables (less CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS, higher 
RELATIVE SIZE, and higher RELATIVE INCOME) which are themselves 
associated with an earlier year. This points once again to the early 
1960s as the prime era for the achievement of successes.
CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS are negatively correlated with RELATIVE SIZE 
(r=-.39). As size decreased conflictual catalysts increased. An 
increase in conflictual catalysts preceded a decrease in size, pointing 
to the previously mentioned relationship between CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS 
and RELATIVE INCOME. Conflictual catalysts are slightly more 
significantly tied to a decrease in income, which is then followed by a 
decrease in the size of the constituency.
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An EXTERNAL CATALYST is positively related to the RELATIVE SIZE 
(r=.23). Only 18% of the restructurings associated with a decrease in 
relative size had an external catalyst. For restructurings occurring 
while size was maintaining or increasing, though, the increase is 
significant: 39% of those occurring during periods of maintaining size
and 50% of those occurring while size was increasing sprang from 
external catalysts. In proportional terms a restructuring that occurred 
during a period of growth in the constituency was most likely to be 
preceded by an external catalyst. In reality the majority (ten of 
sixteen) of external catalysts occurred during the long phase of 
constancy in size. It is, therefore, the very few external catalysts 
during the final period of decline rather than numerous external 
catalysts during periods of growth that is surfacing here,
RELATIVE SIZE is also negatively related to the TYPE OF DISJUNCTION 
(r=-.47). Again this is reflecting the predominance of problematic 
disjunctions as size is decreasing. With the transition from a trend of 
increasing size to a phase of stable size in late 1964, the proportion 
of restructurings with problematic disjunctions increased. However, it 
was not until mid-1966, when size began to steadily and consistently 
decline, that problematic disjunctions became the mode--occurring in 62% 
of the restructurings. A similar pattern is seen in relation to 
RELATIVE INCOME (r=-.43). Since a decrease in income preceded a 
decrease in size, and a decrease in size preceded the predominance of 
problematic disjunctions, it seems appropriate to conclude that as SNCC 
began to disintegrate with regard to resources, changes within the 
organization became more problematic. Problems were occurring which the 
organization could not control, and internally there was less consensus
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on how things should change.
SNCC's unique restructurings add the following relationships to the 
total picture of the organization's history. Successes occurred 
early in SNCC's history. Those restructurings involving three or four 
elements leaned toward more ends-based changes. And, as SNCC's size 
decreased it responded to less external catalysts, more conflictual 
catalysts, and had more problematic changes in the first element of its 
restructurings.
Common Correlations with Changes in the Elements
In addition to looking at relationships among the central 
variables, it is potentially informative to delineate correlations 
between changes in each of the individual elements and these central 
variables in order to illuminate the conditions in which each particular 
variable changed. For this analysis changes in each element are coded 
dichotomously: 1 if the element changed in a given restructuring and 0
if it did not. This section will focus on only those relationships 
which are significant for both CORE and SNCC. (Correlation coefficients 
are provided in Appendix C .)
A change in activities is negatively correlated with CONFLICTUAL 
CATALYSTS (CORE r=-.35, SNCC r=-.21) and positively related to RELATIVE 
SIZE (CORE r=.22, SNCC r=.38) For CORE a conflictual catalyst never 
resulted in a change in activities. For SNCC 23% of restructurings 
preceded by conflictual catalysts produced changes in activities, but 
this is still an under-representation of changes in A compared to its 
overall incidence. During periods when size was increasing, 54% of 
CORE's restructurings and 75% of SNCC's changes involved a change in 
activities. Conversely, when size was decreasing only 28% of CORE's and
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18% of SNCC's restructurings involved a change in this element. 
Therefore, changes in activities are most likely to occur in 
restructurings responding to nonconflictual catalysts and during trends 
of increasing size.
A change in resources is positively correlated with the TYPE OF 
DISJUNCTION (CORE r=.33, SNCC r=.42) and the SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING 
(CORE r=.24, SNCC r=.22). Interpretations of these correlations must 
proceed cautiously because R was such a frequently changed element, 
especially for SNCC, that it occurred in the majority of restructurings, 
regardless of other variables. SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING is again an 
organizational variable for CORE, and therefore a positive relationship 
here is pointing to the fact that changes in resources occurred most 
frequently later in CORE's history. For SNCC there is a significant 
difference, though, between the involvement of resources in over 70% of 
the regional and national restructurings and in only 40% of the local 
restructurings.
For CORE 82% of restructurings with problematic disjunctions 
involved a change in R while only 45% of non-problematic disjunctions 
brought resources into play. For SNCC all problematic disjunctions 
involved R in the restructuring. However, only 43% of all changes in 
resources had problematic disjunctions. A problematic first element 
change is a sure indicator that resources were involved in the 
restructuring; however, a change in resources does not necessarily 
imply a problem with the first element.
Resources, then, were often involved in restructurings which had a 
problematic change in the first element and affected a broad geographic 
area. Not only were resources involved in these restructurings with
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problematic disjunctions, but in the majority of these cases resources 
was actually the first, and therefore the problematic, element.
Resources change profusely throughout the histories of CORE and, 
especially, SNCC. The current correlations reveal that these changes 
were most frequent later in the groups' histories, and that resources 
were most often changed during this period in the form of a sudden loss 
of either money or a usable constituency rather then as a calculated and 
planned change within the organization.
Changes in the task structure display no common correlations across 
CORE and SNCC; however, domain is positively correlated with SUCCESS 
(CORE r=.39, SNCC r-.22) and EXTERNAL CATALYSTS (CORE r=.23, SNCC 
r=.20). External catalysts led to a disproportionate amount of changes 
in domain: 36% of CORE's external catalysts and 38% of SNCC's were
answered, in part, by a change in D. Also slightly over half of all 
domain changes occurred in response to external catalysts. Therefore, 
although the majority of external catalysts did not involve a change in 
D, this element most frequently changed in response to an external 
catalyst.
Approximately half of all restructurings associated with successes 
involved a change in domain. This is in contrast to less than 30% of 
all restructurings which involved such a change. For CORE this means 
that 66% of all domain changes were somehow associated with successes, 
but for SNCC only 27% of the changes in domain were so involved. The 
relationship between success and a change in domain, therefore, is 
unclear. The role of domain changes appears more crucial when it is 
recognized that three of CORE's four causal linkages between 
restructurings and instances of success, and two of SNCC's three such
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linkages involve a change in domain. These causal linkages involving 
domain are evenly distributed among restructurings which preceded, 
occurred coterminously with, or followed an instance of success. So 
while changes in domain are over-represented in success - related 
restructurings, the value of domain changes for encouraging successes or 
the effect of success on realigning the organization's goals or focus is 
unclear.
In short changes in activities occur most frequently during 
periods of growth and in response to nonconflictual catalysts. Changes 
in resources are abundant throughout CORE's and SNCC's histories. 
However, they occur most frequently in later years and often involve a 
problem with the element rather than a calculated decision to change. 
Finally, domain changes most frequently occur in response to an external 
catalyst and are, in some unclear way, linked to the attainment of 
success.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE GENERALIZABILITY OR KREPS' THEORY AND CONCLUSIONS
If Kreps' theory and the applications of it are illuminating 
characteristics of organization sui generis rather than of groups in 
specific substantive contexts, findings from different substantive areas 
should display some convergence. Not all findings from disaster studies 
have a relevant counterpart in other social settings. Variables from 
previous research using Kreps' theory such as Scope of Impact, Length of 
Forewarning, and others clearly are applicable in the disaster setting 
but are irrelevent in other non-disaster-related forms of association 
and organization. However, the more strictly organizational variables 
are relevant to all structural configurations. If the findings of 
previous disaster-related research point to relationships that do not 
appear in other contexts, the best that can be said of the theory is 
that it is applicable only in disasters, and the worst would be that 
previous research has somehow been significantly flawed so that 
documented relationships have little relationship to actual events. It 
is important, then, not only to examine the possibility of using the 
theory to study organizations outside of disasters, but also to compare 
the findings from these disaster- and non-disaster-related analyses to 
test the theory and to grasp the dynamics of organization itself.
For Kreps' (1985) variables that are relevant to CORE and SNCC, the 
correspondence between previous findings and the current research point
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to relationships that can be generalized outside the disaster setting.
Of course, we are still dealing in an analysis of social movement 
organizations with extra-normal organizations. To more persuasively 
document the generalizability of both earlier findings and the current 
findings, it will be necessary to look not at the margins of 
conventional society, but directly into the structural and 
organizational forms of common existence. Perhaps there ;Ls^ something 
structurally unique about forms of association that are created to 
change an aspect of the existing environment, whether the change is seen 
as an attempt to return to "normal" (as in disasters), or if it is an 
attempt to change what exists and to move on to a new "normal" (as in 
social movement organizations). This research cannot point to such 
peculiarities. Only through more research on conventional organizations 
can such anomalies be exposed and can more universal relationships be 
asserted.
Moving back in the life histories of the organizations for a 
moment, Saunders and Kreps (1986) and Bosworth and Kreps (1986) discuss 
the origins system state. According to the logic of the origins metric 
(Kreps, 1985a) CORE's pattern of origins (R-A-D-T) is scored -1, while 
SNCC's D-R-T-A origins configuration receives a score of +2. In 
origins, then, CORE was more oriented to means, or action, than was 
SNCC. According to the earlier studies in disaster, a greater degree of 
action at origins is associated with less means based restructuring at 
maintenance. These previous findings are substantiated here with CORE's 
more action-driven origins (metric score of -1) paired with less 
means-based restructuring (mean metric score of -0.8). In turn SNCC's 
more order-driven origins (metric score of +2) is linked to a greater
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degree of means-based restructuring (mean metric score of -2.0).
Neither CORE nor SNCC exhibits a pattern of predominantly ends-based 
restructuring, however CORE and its action-driven origins period is 
significantly less oriented toward means-based restructurings than is 
the order-driven SNCC.
Kreps also found that the more complex the social network of the 
organization at maintenance, the greater the degree of means-based 
restructuring. CORE, with its higher average metric score, was linked 
to an average of 1.2 other organizations at the time of each 
restructuring, while for the more means-based SNCC the organization 
displayed three inter-group links at the time of each restructuring.
For CORE the correlation between the total number of links and the 
metric score is -.27, clearly indicating that there was a tendency for 
more means-based restructurings to occur when the organization was 
linked to a larger number of other units. Although this relationship is 
still negative for SNCC, it is neither significant nor sizable.
Looking at the actual mean metric scores for those restructurings 
which occurred while the organization was linked to a small number of 
other groups (one or two) compared to when it was involved in a more 
complex social network (links with three to five other groups), the 
relationship between a complex social network and means-based changes is 
apparent, as is the reason for the disparity in correlation strengths. 
CORE's restructurings with few links have a mean metric score of 0.04, 
while those which occurred in conjunction with a larger number of links 
have an average metric score of -3.2. Part of this disparity can be 
attributed to the higher metric scores of earlier restructurings when 
CORE also had fewer links to other organizations. However, looking at
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only the 1960's the difference is still evident, although it is not so 
extreme. In this later period restructurings with few links had a mean 
metric score of -1.5, while those with more links show an average score 
of -3.0.
For SNCC, the relationship is evident, but it is much less clear. 
Restructurings which occurred when the organization had fewer links show 
a mean metric score of -1.6, while those with more links had an average 
metric score of -2.2. This slight difference is further clouded by the 
fact that the majority (9 of 11) of restructurings with a metric score 
above the mid-point were also associated with a more complex social 
network. Also, slightly more of the restructurings which occurred 
during periods when SNCC had a complex social network display metric 
scores above the mid-point. There is, then, a slight tendency for 
restructurings occurring during periods of more complex social networks 
to have lower scores for SNCC, but it must be remembered that the 
majority of ends-based restructurings also occurred in conjunction with 
more complex social networks.
The current findings tend to support Kreps' original finding.
There does seem to be a pattern here, but it is not an unambiguous 
relationship. Looking at SNCC as the organization with a more complex 
network, it is true that, overall, more inter-organizational links are 
associated with a stronger means-based orientation. This is the 
dimension and unit of analysis employed in Kreps1 previous work, so I am 
confirming what he found. Looking within SNCC's history, though, there 
seems to be reason to doubt whether the links the organization maintains 
at the time of a particular restructuring are significantly related to 
the means-ends strain of the change.
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A final finding from Kreps is that a larger size is related to a 
greater degree of means-based restructuring. Support for this finding 
is equivocal. CORE was a much larger organization than SNCC in terms of 
formal constituency, but it was less means-based in its average 
restructuring than SNCC. Another way of testing this previous finding 
is to see if periods of increasing size are related to more means-based 
changes. For CORE this is clearly the case as seen in the negative 
correlation between RELATIVE SIZE and METRIC SCORE (r=-.26). SNCC, 
however, shows no significant relationship between these two variables. 
The most supportive finding is in the correlation between ABSOLUTE SIZE 
of the organization (i.e., number of people in active constituency) at 
the time of each restructuring and the METRIC SCORE (CORE r=-.45, SNCC 
r=-.34). Here both CORE and SNCC clearly show that a larger 
constituency is related to means-based changes. This final relationship 
reinforces Kreps' original finding that the larger the organization, the 
more means-based the restructurings. However, this finding pertains to 
individual instances of restructuring, not to the entire history of a 
group, and the relationship between periods of growth and the means-ends 
strain of relevant changes remains unclear.
The current work can lend further support to Kreps' (1985) finding 
that a greater degree of order at origins is related with a greater 
degree of means-based restructuring at maintenance. With the above 
qualifications in mind, research on CORE and SNCC can also support the 
finding that a more complex social network and a larger size of the 
organization are associated with a greater degree of means-based 
restructuring.
If findings from the current work reflect organizational patterns
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rather than merely patterns of social movement organizations, they 
should also show some similarity with Linn's (1986) initial study of 
organizational restructuring in the disaster context. As with all 
disaster-related research, the temporal parameters of the organizations 
in this previous project were much shorter than CORE'S and SNCC1s. In 
Linn's work it was found that means-based restructurings are most 
prevalent. The current work can certainly support this. Linn's mean 
was -3.5 for his sample of disaster related restructurings, and his 
median was -4. In the current work both CORE and SNCC display average 
metric scores leaning towards means-based restructuring. CORE'S median 
is slightly higher than Linn's finding at -1, but SNCC's median is -4, 
the same as in the previous research.
In addition to this predominance of means-based forms, Linn found 
that the majority of restructurings involved very few elements. Of the 
restructurings he uncovered in disaster-related organizations, 67% were 
one- or two-element forms. This predominance of less extensive 
restructurings is even more apparent in CORE and SNCC, in which fully 
88% of all restructurings involved only one or two elements.
Linn also found that the greater the degree of the restructuring 
(i.e. greater number of elements changed) the higher the metric score. 
More specifically he found that one- through three-element forms tended 
to be means-based while complete four-element restructurings showed a 
strain toward ends. In SNCC a similar pattern is found. However, for 
this organization both three- and four-element forms show a strain 
towards ends. The relative consistency in mean metric scores across 
CORE'S one- to three-element changes also lends partial support to this 
previous finding. While the current work cannot fully either support or
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refute Linn's finding, it does apear that less extensive restructurings 
are means-based and that there may be a tendency towards ends in more 
extensive changes. However, the specific number of elements at which 
the switch from means-based to ends-based forms prevail is not clear. 
Other than the strain toward means, the findings are far from decisive.
Finally, Linn found that means-based restructuring does not 
necessarily enhance speed. In my research the METRIC SCORE and TOTAL 
TIME OF RESTRUCTURING are positively correlated for CORE, but are not 
significantly related for SNCC. This means that for CORE means-based 
change does enhance speed, while for SNCC the means-ends slant of the 
restructuring makes little difference with regard to speed. I cannot 
say, then that means-based restructuring undeniably enhances speed. I 
can say, though, that during periods of predominantly means-based 
changes total times of restructurings are much shorter. When changes 
are occurring very rapidly and frequently, means-based restructuring 
predominates. However, specific instances of means-based restructuring 
are not necessarily faster than individual ends-based changes.
The current analysis of CORE and SNCC can lend some support to 
earlier disaster-specific findings, and therefore suggest a degree of 
generalizability for both the theory and these previous conclusions. A 
strain towards order in the origins system state is associated with a 
greater degree of means-based restructuring at maintenance. There is 
also some support for the assertion that a more complex social network 
also corresponds to more means-based changes, at least in the overall 
history. The relationship between a larger size of the unit and 
means-based restructurings also receives some confirmation, but in this 
case it holds true with regard to individual changes rather than total
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histories.
As in the previous study of restructuring, a clear dominance of 
means-based and less extensive forms is displayed by CORE and SNCC. The 
relationship between a higher metric score and more extensive changes is 
tenuous, and the specific parameters of this relationship are unclear, 
but the current findings hint at the possibility of such a pattern. 
Finally in CORE and SNCC increased speed is not unequivocally tied to 
means-based changes, but it is clearly associated with periods in which 
means-based restructurings predominate.
CONCLUSION
CORE and SNCC display very similar patterns of restructuring across 
their entire histories. An initial period of ends-based changes during 
which the task structure of the organization is repeatedly defined gives 
way to a period of almost exclusively means-based restructurings. It is 
during this means-based phase that most successes are achieved. 
Immediately following a setback in usable income, the organization once 
again brings its structural ends into question, and a mixed period of 
restructurings commences. This final mixed phase lasts until, on a note 
of ends-based change, the group transforms to a smaller enclave of 
militant members.
Earlier restructurings are enacted in response to less conflictual 
catalysts and are, themselves, relatively unproblematic. These earlier 
changes take a longer time to complete and affect a smaller geographic 
area. It is also during this earlier phase that income is most 
consistently increasing. Although the relationship between trends in
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size and the calendar year are different for CORE and SNCC, trends in 
the size of the constituency mimic existing trends in income. 
Irrespective of the chronological placement of a restructuring, those 
changes with a non-problematic transition in the first changing element 
tend to be less means-based.
With regard to the achievement of success, several relationships 
emerge. Restructurings which occur while income and size are steadily 
increasing or holding constant are much more likely to be associated 
with an instance of success than changes that occur when resources are 
decreasing. Additionally, changes that result from a nonconflictual 
catalyst and which call into play more elements are more frequently 
linked to the achievement of success.
Findings for coterminous time periods show that the 1960's were a 
time of very rapid and means-based change for these groups. The first 
four years of this decade encompassed a series of almost exclusively 
means-based changes and the majority of all successes. After temporally 
similar setbacks in income, the groups both entered phases during which 
ends-based changes were interspersed among the frequent means-based 
restructurings. Finally, within a year of each other both groups 
transformed into small cadres of militant members.
With such apparent consistencies for coterminous time frames, 
Goldstone's (1980) critique of Gamson's original work on protest groups 
must be kept in mind. Perhaps, as Goldstone asserts, there are periods 
during which broader societal variables are such that success is much 
easier to achieve. It could be that this is what is occurring in the 
early 1960's. In addition, perhaps these external events and forces are 
not important just with regard to successes; perhaps they are also key
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in determining the life histories of social movement organizations 
overall.
The limited time span during which most successes are achieved, the 
transitions between and the duration of subsequent phases, the patterns 
within these phases, and the temporally similar demises of CORE and SNCC 
all bring into question the importance of organizational variables and 
dynamics versus the influence and importance of larger society factors. 
It seems that both organizational and larger world phenomena are 
influential in these groups. While the external variables are indeed 
crucial and intertwined with many of the current findings on CORE and 
SNCC, there is also evidence throughout these findings of organizational 
patterns which are apparently independent of the encompassing time frame 
or external environment. While many questions remain unanswered, the 
current research can only state these relationships as they appear, 
without conjecture about the explanation behind them. This task of 
separating temporally coterminous findings from independent structural 
relationships can be advanced only in more extensive research on a 
variety of social movement organizations.
Kreps' structural theory has shed some light on the patterns and 
relationships of CORE and SNCC, both as representatives of social 
movement organizations and as organization sui generis. The current 
research, in turn, has illustrated that Kreps' theory can be employed in 
substantive areas other than disasters. The convergence between 
findings from these social movement organizations and previous 
disaster-related findings also suggest that Kreps' theory has uncovered 
some aspects of organization in general rather than just 
disaster-related organizations in particular. Most of the difficulties
101
and necessary revisions associated with employing Kreps' theory were 
discussed in Chapter Two. Just a few issues which need to be kept in 
mind for future research and for refining the theory will be presented 
here.
The definitions of the elements must be precise for each piece of 
research. The concepts are very precise analytically. However the 
theoretical integrity of the concepts is difficult to maintain across 
the many judgment calls that are necessary in delineating 
restructurings. At present these operational terms are precise enough 
to ensure fairly consistent delineations across subsequent 
restructurings within a research project by a single researcher. The 
consistencies between current findings and previous research using 
Kreps' theory also suggest that there is a degree of inter-researcher 
agreement. With each progressive addition to the research employing 
this theory, though, the goal of more standard and explicit operational 
definitions and boundaries for the elements should be attempted and, 
hopefully, approached.
In this same vein, criteria of discontinuity between unique 
restructurings need to be more precise. Articulating these will not be 
a simple task. Discontinuities in time and space and unique catalysts 
served as adequate guidelines in this research, but there are still 
restructurings that it is possible to defend analytically as either 
multiple-element changes or as strings of less extensive changes.
These refinements can come only with extensive research in a 
variety of substantive areas. To expand and test the viability of the 
theory itself, research into forms of association and organization in 
all spheres of the social realm is necessary. With regard to the
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current work, only through research on a broad sample of social movement 
organizations can the present uncertainty about the generalizability of 
the findings and the independent effects of external and structural 
variables be clarified.
We need to work toward increased operational precision and to 
explore social phenomena in diverse substantive areas. Consistency 
among the completed research projects suggests that to a large degree 
the collective representations of these elements and of the points of 
discontinuity between restructurings are fairly well developed. With 
each subsequent application of Kreps1 theory such definitions and 
boundaries should become more clarified and specified. As with all 
social phenomena, theories must always be conceived as both extant 
entity and ever-evolving process. Only by recognizing both the 
underlying constancy of a framework and the ever-present potential for 
revision and improvement can a given theory and the field of sociology 
progress.
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NOTES
1) "System state" refers to Dubin's (1978) definition of the term. It 
is an analytical entity in which (1) all units of the system have 
characteristic values, (2) these values are all determinant, and (3) the 
constellation of unit values persists through time (1978;144). While it 
is very helpful, this definition obviously does not facilitate precise 
delineations of separate system states. Questions concerning the 
thresholds of change for unit values and the duration which constitutes 
"time" remain to be grappled with by the individual theorist. Kreps has 
chosen to designate only three system states--origins, maintenance, and 
suspension--within his theory. A case could clearly be made that the 
restructurings I am analyzing are not only reformulations of the 
organization but that each actually signifies a transition to a new 
system state. By choosing to place all forms containing all four 
elements within one system state, Kreps is allowing for some fluctuation 
of the values for each element while maintaining that as long as all 
four are present in some configuration, organization exists. Kreps' 
designation of system states can therefore be thought of as
"pre-organization" (origins), "organization" (maintenance), and "demise 
of organization" (suspension). The current work focuses on the second 
system state --maintenance. The origins system state is introduced only 
briefly, and suspension is not considered.
2) To present the relevant sources here and minimize distractions during 
the upcoming historical chronologies, bibliographical paragraphs are 
provided for each CORE and SNCC in place of in text citations. The 
principle sources for documenting the history of CORE were Meier and 
Rudwick's (1973) comprehensive history of CORE, James Farmer's (1965) 
discussion of the organization and its focus, and Farmer's (1985) 
autobiography. Inge Powell Bell's (1968) sociological analysis of CORE 
was also informative. The microfilm edition of the CORE Papers was 
useful for filling in the gaps left by secondary sources. Shorter 
pieces by Rudwick and Meier (1969), McKissick (1968), and many others 
provided specific bits of information to the gradually evolved picture.
Of central importance in tracing SNCC's history was Carson's (1981) 
analysis of the group's evolution. Zinn's (1964) coverage of the group, 
and Sellers' (1973) exposition provided valuable information, but the 
focus of these works did not always remain on central historical facts. 
Jim Forman's (1972) tome on SNCC provided both valuable insight and a 
rather precise chronology. Various other works such as Carmichael and 
Hamilton's (1967) demand for Black Power, Stoper's (1977) 
interpretations of the group, Sutherland's (1965) compilation of Freedom 
Summer communications, and Matusow's (1972) history helped to complete 
this picture.
For both groups numberous general histories of the civil rights 
movement added crucial points and a clearer synthesized picture of the 
groups' lives and position in the larger picture.
3) While this lack of internal satisfaction with externally noted gains 
is crucial to SNCC's ensuing history, it is not directly linked to any 
restructuring. This brings to the front a point worthy of note: The
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current theory (or any strictly structural analysis) can document the 
course of an organization. However in a "redemptive organization" 
(Stoper, 1977), such as SNCC, a successful comprehension of its history 
requires the incorporation of non-structural dimensions as well. The 
current analysis can accurately document SNCC's changes. To understand 
these changes, though, requires a very subjective type of explanation 
that is not even attempted here. This incompleteness does not cripple 
the current analysis; for the purpose of this study, and all research, 
is to augment existing knowledge, not to render previous research 
unnecessary.
4) This analysis of CORE and SNCC is specifically interested in the 
generalizability and applicability of Kreps' theory, but a few words 
about the difficulties of documenting successes must also be mentioned. 
Like with many restructurings, successes often appear as the culmination 
of an elongated period of gradually increasing gains. As in 
restructurings, such trends in success are documented when they pass a 
threshold of observability. More than with regard to restructurings, 
the problem of previous author's selective inclusion of successes 
plagues the research. Gamson's criteria included collective 
representations of various factions to delineate successful groups.
This inter-reporter consistency is also relied on less formally in the 
current work. However in delineating individual instances of success 
rather than overall gains, such convergence by a full range of sources 
is often not possible in each case.
Successes for SNCC are particularly difficult. Its largest gains 
were arguably in consciousness raising--a category not included in the 
current research. Even more difficult, SNCC considered many of the 
gains attributed to it by others to be insults or testimony to the 
remaining enormity of the task before them rather than as crucial 
accomplishments. Finally, two of the group's primary gains were 
achieved under the formal banners of COFO and the MFDP. In my view both 
COFO and the MFDP were basically pseudonyms for SNCC at the time of 
these gains, so the successes can be assigned to SNCC. Distinctions 
such as these decrease clarity, but it is by struggling with such 
delineations that a better grasp of "success" as a concept is 
concretized.
5) It is noted that TOTAL TIME is very highly correlated with TIME TO 
FIRST ELEMENT. This relationship is saying that there is a very strong 
relationship between the lag from the catalyst to the initiation of 
restructuring and the total time from the catalyst to the last 
restructuring element. Because the second of these variables 
encompasses the first, this is primarily an artifactual relationship.
In addition, with the large number of one-element forms, the fact that 
both CORE and SNCC have a correlation of .89 on this measure means very 
little.
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ITEMS 
CASE I.D.
DATE STARTED
DATE STARTED
DATE COMPLETED
DATE COMPLETED
CONTINUED AS TREND
FORM OF RESTRUCTURING
APPENDIX A 
VARIABLE LABELS
MONTH ___
00 = UNCERTAIN
Y E A R ___
00 = UNCERTAIN
MONTH ___
00 = UNCERTAIN
Y E A R ___
00 = UNCERTAIN
1 = YES 
0 = NO
9 = UNCERTAIN
01 = D
02 = T 33 RTD
03 R 34 = RTA
04 = A 35 = ATR
05 = DT 36 ATD
06 = DR 37 = ART
07 = DA 38 = ARD
08 = TD 39 = ADR
09 = TR 40 = ADT
10 = TA 41 = DTRA
11 - RD 42 = DTAR
12 = RT 43 = DRAT
13 = RA 44 = DRTA
14 = AD 45 = DATR
15 = AT 46 = DART
16 = AR 47 = TRAD
17 = DAT 48 = TRDA
18 = DAR 49 = TADR
19 = DTR 50 = TARD
20 = DTA 51 TDRA
21 = DRT 52 « TDAR
22 = DRA 53 = RADT
23 = TRD 54 - RATD
24 = TRA 55 = RDTA
25 = TDA 56 RDAT
26 = TDR 57 = RTDA
27 = TAR 58 = RTAD
28 = TAD 59 = ADTR
29 = RDA 60 ADRT
30 = RDT 61 = ATDR
31 = RAT 62 == ATRD
32 = RAD 
64 =
63
ARTD
= ARDT
COLUMNS
1-3_____
4-5_____
6-7_____
8-9_____
10-11_____
12_____
13-14
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CATALYST 1 = BENIGN/INTERNAL
2 = BENIGN/EXTERNAL
3 = CONFLICTUAL/INTERNAL
4 = CONFLICTUAL/EXTERNAL 
0 = UNCERTAIN
15
DISJUNCTION 1 = CHANGE
2 = INTRA-EL. DISPARITY
3 - CONTINGENCY 
0 = UNCERTAIN
16
TIME: CAT - 1 WEEKS
999 = UNCERTAIN 
888 = N/A
17-19
TIME: 1 - 2
TIME: 2 - 3
WEEKS
999 = UNCERTAIN 
888 = N/A
WEEKS
999 = UNCERTAIN 
888 = N/A
20-22
23-25
TIME: 3 - 4
TOTAL (CAT - LAST)
TOTAL (1 - LAST)
WEEKS
999 = UNCERTAIN 
888 = N/A
WEEKS
999 = UNCERTAIN 
888 = N/A
WEEKS
999 = UNCERTAIN 
888 = N/A
26-28
29-31
32-34
CHANGE IN DOMAINS 0 = N/A
1 = COORDINATE
2 = LOCATION
3 = NONVIOLENCE
4 = MEMBERSHIP
5 = EMPHASIS
35
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SPECIFIC D
ADDITIONAL
CHANGE
CHANGE IN ’
CHANGE 00 - N/A 36-37
01 = COORD./ FEDERATE
02 = NORTH
03 = SOUTH
04 = NORTH (FUNDS)
05 = DEEP SOUTH
06 = NATIONAL
07 = INTERNATIONAL
08 = URBAN
09 = NONVIO (PHIL.)
10 = NONVIO (TACTIC)
11 = END OF NONVIO
12 = ANTI-COMMUNIST
13 = FREE ASSOCIATION
14 = ALL-BLACK
15 - INTERRACIAL
16 = DIRECT ACTION
17 = VOTER REGISTRATION
18 = COMMUNITY ORGANIZING
19 - PARTISAN POLITICS
20 = POOR BLACKS 
(INCLUDES 1 MAN, 1 VOTE)
21 = ANTI-WAR
22 = BLACK POWER
23 = PARAMILITARY
24 - COORDINATE LOCAL UNITS
D SEE CODES ABOVE 38-39
00 - N/A 40-41______
01 = COORDINATING COMM.
02 - INCREASE OF POSITIONS AT NATIONAL OFFICE
03 = DECREASE OF POSITIONS AT NATIONAL OFFICE
04 = INCREASE IN POWER OF ONE SEGMENT
05 = DECREASE IN POWER OF ONE SEGMENT
06 = INCREASE IN # FIELD POSITIONS
07 = DECREASE IN # FIELD POSTITONS
08 = DIVISION OF EXISTING POSITIONS
(INCLUDES CREATION OF BRANCHES)
09 = CHANGE OF POSITION TO SIMILAR POSITION
10 = CREATION OF NEW GOVERNING BODY
11 = WHO SHOULD LEAD?
12 = SYSTEM OF COMMITTEES
13 - FEDERATION OF LOCAL UNITS
ADDITIONAL T CHANGE (SEE CODES ABOVE) 42-43
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CHANGE IN R
ADDITIONAL R 
CHANGE
CHANGE IN A
00 = N/A 44-45
01 = INCREASE MEMBERSHIP
02 = DECREASE MEMBERSHIP
03 = ADDITION OF KEY INDIVIDUALS)
04 = LOSS OF KEY INDIVIDUALS)
05 = CONCENTRATION OF RESOURCES
06 = DISPERSION OF RESOURCES
07 = INCREASED STAFF
08 = DECREASED STAFF
09 = INCREASE IN WHITE STAFF
10 = DECREASE IN WHITE STAFF
11 = INCREASE IN INCOME
12 = DECREASE IN INCOME
13 = INCREASE IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT
14 = DECREASE IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT
15 = INCREASED DEDICATION OF STAFF
16 = DECREASED DEDICATION OF STAFF
17 = CLOSING OFFICES
18 = FIRING STAFF
19 - RADICALIZATION OF STAFF
SEE CODES ABOVE 46-47
00 = N/A 48-49
01 = START DIRECT ACTION
02 = INCREASE DIRECT ACTION
03 = DECREASE DIRECT ACTION
04 = END DIRECT ACTION
05 = START VOTER REGISTRATION
06 = INCREASE VOTER REGISTRATION
07 = DECREASE VOTER REGISTRATION
08 = END VOTER REGISTRATION
09 = COMMUNITY ORG. - EDUCATION
10 = COMMUNITY ORG. - URBAN
11 = COMMUNITY ORG. - GENERAL
12 = NATIONAL PROJECT
13 = START PERIPHERAL ACTIVITIES
14 = INCREASE PERIPHERAL ACTIVITIES
15 = DECREASE PERIPHERAL ACTIVITIES
16 = POLITICS -- PARTISAN
17 = POLITICS -- EXTRA-PARTISAN
18 = DECREASED ACTIVITY
19 = INCREASED ACTIVITY - FIELD
20 - INCREASED ACTIVITY - FUND RAISING
21 = COORDINATE PROTESTS
22 = EMPLOYMENT/HOUSING
23 - RADICALIZING ACTIVITIES
24 = INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL
ADDITIONAL A CHANGE SEE CODES ABOVE 50-51
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SCOPE OF 1 = LOCAL 52
RESTRUCTURING 2 = REGIONAL
3 = NATIONAL
POST-RESTRUCT. 1 = LOCAL 53
SCOPE OF 2 = REGIONAL
ORGANIZATION 3 = NATIONAL
SIZE (RELATIVE) 0 = UNCERTAIN 54
1 = DECREASING
2 - MAINTAINING
3 = INCREASING
SIZE (ABSOLUTE) 0 = UNCERTAIN 55
1 = 50 OR LESS
2 = 51 - 100
3 = 101 - 200
4 = 201 - 500
5 = 501 - 1000
6 = OVER 1000
MONEY (RELATIVE) 0 = UNCERTAIN 56
1 = DECREASING
2 = SAME
3 = INCREASING
MONEY (ABSOLUTE) 1 = 0 - $10,000 57
(CONTRIBUTIONS 2 = $10,001 - $50,000
PER YEAR) 3 = $50,001 - $100,000
4 = $100,001 - $500,000
5 = OVER $500,000
9 = UNCERTAIN
CONSTITUENCY (RACE) 0 = UNCERTAIN 58
1 = INTERRACIAL (INCLUDES PREDOM. WHITE
2 = PREDOM. BLACK
3 = ALL-BLACK
CONSTITUENCY (CLASS) 0 = UNCERTAIN 59
1 = PREDOM. MIDDLE CLASS
2 = MIXTURE
3 = PREDOM. WORKING/LOWER CLASS
LINKAGES--VEP 0 = NO 60
1 = YES
9 = UNCERTAIN
LINKAGES--COFO 0 = NO 61
1 = YES
9 = UNCERTAIN
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LINKAGES--MFDP 0 - NO
1 - YES
9 = UNCERTAIN
LINKAGES--OTHER CIVIL 0 = NO 
RIGHTS (EXCLUDES 1 - YES
COFO, VEP, AND MFDP 9 = UNCERTAIN 
ALLIANCES)
LINKAGES--NON-CIVIL 0 = NO 
RIGHTS 1 = YES
9 = UNCERTAIN
LINKAGES--NON-CIVIL 0 = NO 
RIGHTS (COMMUNIST) 1 = YES
9 = UNCERTAIN
TOTAL LINKS (LOCAL) # (NUMBER)
TOT LINKS (REGIONAL) # (NUMBER)
TOT LINKS (NATIONAL) # (NUMBER)
ANTAGONISTS: 0 = NO
LOCAL 1 = YES
SEGREGATIONISTS 9 = UNCERTAIN
ANTAGONISTS:
LOCAL
OFFICIALS
ANTAGONISTS:
NATIONAL
SEGREGATIONISTS
ANTAGONISTS:
NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT
ANTAGONISTS:
POWER
STRUCTURE
DIPLACEMENT GOALS
CENTRALIZATION
0 = NO
1 = YES
9 = UNCERTAIN
0 = NO
1 = YES
9 = UNCERTAIN
0 = NO
1 = YES
9 = UNCERTAIN
0 = NO
1 = YES
9 = UNCERTAIN
0 = NO
1 = YES
9 = UNCERTAIN/UNCLEAR
1 = DECENTRALIZED
2 = COMBINATION
3 = CENTRALIZED
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63
64
65
66 
67_ 
68_ 
69_
70_
71_
72_
73_
74_
75
Ill
PHILOSOPHY:
NONVIOLENCE
PHILOSOPHY: 
INTER-RACIAL
PHILOSOPHY: 
WORK ITSELF
PHILOSOPHY: 
TOWARD BLACK 
CONSCIOUSNESS 
SEPARATISM
PHILOSOPHY: 
BLACK POWER
METRIC SCORE
BETSY'S METRIC
0 = NO 76
1 = BEING QUESTIONED
2 = AS TACTIC
3 = YES (PHILOSOPHY)
9 = N/A
0 = NO 77
1 = YES
9 = N/A
0 = NO 78
1 = YES
9 = N/A
0 = NO 79
1 = YES
OR 9 = N/A
0 - NO 80
1 = YES 
9 - N/A
01 = -7 81-82
02 =  -6
03 = -5
04 = -4
05 = -3
06 = -2
07 = -1
08 - 0
09 - +1
10 =  +2
11 = +3
12 = +4
13 = +5
14 = +6
15 = +7
03 = -5 83 -84_
04 = -4
05 = -3
06 = -2
07 = -1
08 =  0
09 = +1
10 =  +2
11 = +3
12 = +4
13 = +5 
00 = N/A
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JOHN'S METRIC 06 “ -2
07 = -1
08 = 0
09 = +1
10 = +2
00 = N/A
ORIGINS METRIC 05 = -3
06 = -2
07 “ -1
08 = 0
09 = +1
10 = +2
11 = +3
00 = N/A
NUMBER OF ELEMENTS (NUMBER)
0 == N/A
COMPLEMENTARITY 0 == NO
1 == YES
9 == N/A
85-86
87-88
89
90
IN DEBT NO
YES
UNCERTAIN
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IS RESTRUCTURING 
RELATED TO A 
SUCCESS
0 = NO
1 IMMEDIATELY PRECEDES ONLY
2 IMMEDIATELY AND CAUSALLY PRECEDES
3 “CAUSALLY PRECEDES ONLY
4 =COTERMINOUS ONLY
5 =COTERMINOUS AND CAUSALLY RELATED
6 “IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWS ONLY
7 “CAUSALLY FOLLOWS ONLY
8 “IMMEDIATELY AND CAUSALLY FOLLOWS
9 “UNCERTAIN
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SUCCESS CASE I.D. (NUMBER) 
000 = N/A
93-95
DATE OF SUCCESS 
(MONTH) 00 = N/A
96-97
DATE OF SUCCESS (YEAR)
SCOPE OF SUCCESS
00 = N/A
1 = LOCAL
2 = REGIONAL
3 = NATIONAL 
0 = N/A
98-99
100
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LINKAGES FOR SUCCESS: 
ALONE OR WITH OTHERS
VEP
COFO
MFDP
OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS
NON-CIVIL RIGHTS
ACTIVITIES PRECEDING 
SUCCESS
ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES 
PRECEDING SUCCESS
1 = ALONE 101
2 = INFORMALLY WITH OTHERS
3 = AS PART OF FORMAL COALITION
4 = BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL
0 = N/A
0 = N/A 102
1 = NO
2 = INFORMALLY LINKED
3 = FORMALLY LINKED
9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL
0 = N/A 103
1 = NO
2 = INFORMALLY LINKED
3 = FORMALLY LINKED
9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL
0 = N/A 104
1 = NO
2 = INFORMALLY LINKED
3 = FORMALLY LINKED
9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL
0 = N/A 105
1 = NO
2 = INFORMALLY LINKED
3 = FORMALLY LINKED
9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL
0 = N/A 106
1 = NO
2 = INFORMALLY LINKED
3 = FORMALLY LINKED
9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL
0 =N/A 107
1 = DIRECT ACTION
2 = VOTER REGISTRATION
3 = EMPLOYMENT/HOUSING
8 = OTHER
9 = UNCERTAIN
SEE CODES ABOVE 108
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TYPE OF ACCEPTANCE
RELEVANT ANTAGONIST
TYPE OF ADVANTAGES
ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGES
ENFORCEMENT OR 
NEW REGULATION
DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE
SUCCESS OCCURS DURING 
ORIGINS
NUMBER OF ELEMENTS IN 
PLACE (FOR THOSE 
OCCURING DURING 
ORIGINS ONLY)
0 = N/A 109
1 = CONSULTATION
2 - NEGOTIATION
3 = FORMAL RECOGNITION
4 = INCLUSION
0 = N/A 110
1 = LOCAL SEGREGATIONISTS
2 = LOCAL OFFICIALS
3 = NATIONAL SEGREGATIONISTS
4 = NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
5 - POWER STRUCTURE 
9 = UNCERTAIN
0 = N/A 111______
1 = VOTING RIGHTS/REGISTRATION
2 = PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
3 - HOUSING/EMPLOYMENT 
9 = OTHER
SEE CODES ABOVE 112______
0 = N/A 113______
1 = ENFORCING EXISTING LAWS
2 = CREATION OF NEW LAWS
3 = COMBINATION ENFORCEMENT AND CREATION 
9 = UNCERTAIN
0 = N/A 114
1 = NOT SEEN AS SUCCESS BY GROUP
2 = CONCESSION
3 = IMPORTANT GAIN
4 = CRUCIAL GAIN 
9 = UNCERTAIN
1 = NO 115
2 - YES
3 = IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING,
PRIOR TO ANY RESTRUCTURING 
0 = N/A
(NUMBER) 116
0 = N/A
115
IS RESTRUCTURING 
RELATED TO 
ANOTHER SUCCESS
0 = NO
1 IMMEDIATELY PRECEDES ONLY
2 IMMEDIATELY AND CAUSALLY PRECEDES
3 =CAUSALLY PRECEDES ONLY
4 =COTERMINOUS ONLY
5 =COTERMINOUS AND CAUSALLY RELATED
6 IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWS ONLY
7 =CAUSALLY FOLLOWS ONLY
8 =IMMEDIATELY AND CAUSALLY FOLLOWS
9 =UNCERTAIN
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SUCCESS CASE I.D. (NUMBER) 
000 = N/A
118-120
DATE OF SUCCESS 
(MONTH) 00 = N/A
121-122
DATE OF SUCCESS (YEAR)
00 = N/A
123-124
SCOPE OF SUCCESS 1 - LOCAL
2 = REGIONAL
3 - NATIONAL 
0 = N/A
125
LINKAGES FOR SUCCESS:
ALONE OR WITH OTHERS 1 = ALONE
2 = INFORMALLY WITH OTHERS
3 = AS PART OF FORMAL COALITION
4 = BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL 
0 = N/A
126
VEP 0 = N/A 127
1 = NO
2 = INFORMALLY LINKED
3 = FORMALLY LINKED
9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL
COFO 0 - N/A 128
1 = NO
2 = INFORMALLY LINKED
3 = FORMALLY LINKED
9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL
MFDP 0 = N/A 129
1 = NO
2 = INFORMALLY LINKED
3 = FORMALLY LINKED
9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL
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OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS
NON-CIVIL RIGHTS
ACTIVITIES PRECEDING 
SUCCESS
ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES 
PRECEDING SUCCESS
TYPE OF ACCEPTANCE 
RELEVANT ANTAGONIST
TYPE OF ADVANTAGES
ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGES
ENFORCEMENT OR 
NEW REGULATION
0 - N/A 130
1 - NO
2 - INFORMALLY LINKED
3 = FORMALLY LINKED
9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL
0 = N/A 131
1 = NO
2 = INFORMALLY LINKED
3 - FORMALLY LINKED
9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL
0 =N/A 132_
1 = DIRECT ACTION
2 = VOTER REGISTRATION
3 = EMPLOYMENT/HOUSING
8 = OTHER
9 - UNCERTAIN
SEE CODES ABOVE 133
0 = N/A 134
1 = CONSULTATION
2 = NEGOTIATION
3 = FORMAL RECOGNITION
4 = INCLUSION
0 = N/A 135
1 = LOCAL SEGREGATIONISTS
2 - LOCAL OFFICIALS
3 = NATIONAL SEGREGATIONISTS
4 = NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
5 = POWER STRUCTURE 
9 = UNCERTAIN
0 = N/A 136____
1 - VOTING RIGHTS/REGISTRATION
2 = PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
3 = HOUSING/EMPLOYMENT 
9 = OTHER
SEE CODES ABOVE 137___
0 = N/A 138___
1 = ENFORCING EXISTING LAWS
2 = CREATION OF NEW LAWS
3 - COMBINATION ENFORCEMENT AND CREATION 
9 - UNCERTAIN
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DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE 0 = N/A 139
1 = NOT SEEN AS SUCCESS BY GROUP
2 = CONCESSION
3 = IMPORTANT GAIN
4 = CRUCIAL GAIN 
9 = UNCERTAIN
SUCCESS OCCURS DURING 
ORIGINS
1 = NO
2 = YES
3 = IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING,
PRIOR TO ANY RESTRUCTURING 
0 = N/A
140
NUMBER OF ELEMENTS IN _ (NUMBER)
PLACE (FOR THOSE 0 = N/A
OCCURING DURING 
ORIGINS ONLY)
141
IS RESTRUCTURING 
RELATED TO 
ANOTHER SUCCESS
0 = NO
1 IMMEDIATELY PRECEDES ONLY
2 =IMMEDIATELY AND CAUSALLY PRECEDES
3 =CAUSALLY PRECEDES ONLY
4 =COTERMINOUS ONLY
5 =COTERMINOUS AND CAUSALLY RELATED
6 IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWS ONLY
7 =CAUSALLY FOLLOWS ONLY
8 IMMEDIATELY AND CAUSALLY FOLLOWS
9 =UNCERTAIN
142
SUCCESS CASE I.D.
DATE OF SUCCESS 
(MONTH)
(NUMBER) 
000 = N/A
DATE OF SUCCESS (YEAR)
SCOPE OF SUCCESS
LINKAGES FOR SUCCESS 
ALONE OR WITH OTHERS
00 = N/A
00 = N/A
1 = LOCAL
2 = REGIONAL
3 = NATIONAL 
0 = N/A
1 = ALONE
2 = INFORMALLY WITH OTHERS
3 = AS PART OF FORMAL COALITION
4 = BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL 
0 = N/A
143-145
146-147
148-149
150
151
118
VEP
COFO
MFDP
OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS
NON-CIVIL RIGHTS
ACTIVITIES PRECEDING 
SUCCESS
ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES 
PRECEDING SUCCESS
TYPE OF ACCEPTANCE 
RELEVANT ANTAGONIST
0 = N/A 152
1 = NO
2 = INFORMALLY LINKED
3 = FORMALLY LINKED
9 - UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL
0 - N/A 153
1 - NO
2 - INFORMALLY LINKED
3 = FORMALLY LINKED
9 - UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL
0 = N/A 154
1 - NO
2 = INFORMALLY LINKED
3 - FORMALLY LINKED
9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL
0 - N/A 155
1 - NO
2 = INFORMALLY LINKED
3 = FORMALLY LINKED
9 « UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL
0 = N/A 156
1 = NO
2 = INFORMALLY LINKED
3 = FORMALLY LINKED
9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL
0 -N/A 157
1 = DIRECT ACTION
2 = VOTER REGISTRATION
3 = EMPLOYMENT/HOUSING
8 = OTHER
9 = UNCERTAIN
SEE CODES ABOVE 158
0 - N/A 159
1 = CONSULTATION
2 = NEGOTIATION
3 = FORMAL RECOGNITION
4 = INCLUSION
0 = N/A 160
1 - LOCAL SEGREGATIONISTS
2 = LOCAL OFFICIALS
3 - NATIONAL SEGREGATIONISTS
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TYPE OF ADVANTAGES
ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGES
ENFORCEMENT OR 
NEW REGULATION
DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE
SUCCESS OCCURS DURING 
ORIGINS
NUMBER OF ELEMENTS IN 
PLACE (FOR THOSE 
OCCURING DURING 
ORIGINS ONLY
4 - NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
5 = POWER STRUCTURE 
9 = UNCERTAIN
0 = N/A 161______
1 - VOTING RIGHTS/REGISTRATION
2 = PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
3 = HOUSING/EMPLOYMENT
9 = OTHER
SEE CODES ABOVE 162______
0 = N/A 163______
1 - ENFORCING EXISTING LAWS
2 = CREATION OF NEW LAWS
3 = COMBINATION ENFORCEMENT AND CREATION 
9 = UNCERTAIN
0 = N/A 164
1 « NOT SEEN AS SUCCESS BY GROUP
2 - CONCESSION
3 = IMPORTANT GAIN
4 = CRUCIAL GAIN 
9 = UNCERTAIN
1 = NO 165
2 = YES
3 = IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING,
PRIOR TO ANY RESTRUCTURING 
0 = N/A
(NUMBER) 166
0 = N/A
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APPENDIX B: THE CHRONOLOGIES OF CORE AND SNCC
Complete Chronology of CORE'S Restructurings and Successes 
With Specific Changes in Elements and Gains
Date of 
Restructuring 
or Success
June 1943
Form of 
Restructuring 
or Success
D-T
June 1944
Specific Changes in Elements 
or Type of Success
D:Geographic scope of organization 
expanded to national. "The purpose 
of this organization shall be to 
federate local interracial groups 
working to abolish the color line 
through nonviolent direct action."
T:Loose federation of local chapters. 
Officer positions included chairman 
and combination secretary/treasurer.
T:Executive Committee created. Officer 
positions expanded to include three 
vice-chairmen.
June 1945
April 1947
June 1947 
June 1948
T
T-R
June 1948 D
June 1949
T:Executive Committee no longer primary 
policy-making body. Council, which 
was composed of the executive committee 
plus two representatives from each chapter, 
was created and became policy-making 
unit. Officer positions now shifted to 
include a chairman, one vice-chairman, 
a secretary, treasurer, and executive 
secretary.
A:Direct action project by national group in 
the form of the Journey of Reconciliation.
T:Field representative position created.
T:Second field representative position 
created.
R:Manuel Talley selected to fill this second 
field representative position.
D:Statement on Communism drafted which
formally stated that Communist-controlled 
groups could neither join nor be retained 
as a part of CORE.
T:Increased field positions to include 
six field representatives. Increased the 
strength of the Council and abolished 
the Executive Committee.
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1950
June 1951 
January 1954
June 1954 
March 1956
September 1956
1957 - 1960
December 1957
October 1959
February 1960- 
July 1960
October 1960- 
December 1960
A-R A:Initiation of trend of
decreasing amounts of direct action 
proj ects.
R:Trend of declining membership and 
number of active units.
T-R-A T:Created positions of part-time fund
raiser and full-time field worker.
R:James Robinson appointed as fund raiser.
A:Increased active pursuit for contributions,
R-T R:Resignation of Houser as executive
secretary.
T:Duties of executive secretary divided 
into three positions. Field worker 
position abolished.
R R:Benchmark of upward trend in income.
T T:National Action Committee created as
new central body.
R R:Promotion of James Robinson to
executive secretary position.
T-A-D T:Creation of two field worker positions
in the South.
A:Added voter registration and enforcement 
of school desegregation as central 
types of action.
D:Expanded geographic area of influence 
to include the South.
Advantage Passage of Sharkey-Brown-Isaacs Bill,
a New York City fair-housing law
T T:Created positions in public relations
and special fund raising.
A-T-R A:Increased activity of field workers in
the South. Sympathy protests proliferate 
in North.
T:Created three more field secretary 
positions and post of field director.
R:Student advisors brought in. Increase 
in number of new units being formed.
Bulk of workers and funds shifted to 
the South.
R-T R:Ousted James Robinson as Executive
Secretary.
T:Eliminated position of Executive Secretary 
and created new post of National 
Director.
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February 1961
May 1961
June 1961
June 1961- 
April 1962
September 1961
October 1961
October 1961- 
October 1962
April 1962- 
October 1963
J une 1962 
August 1962
R R:James Farmer assumed new National 
Director position.
A:Resurgence of a national project in 
the Freedom Rides.
Acceptance: 
Consultation
D-A
Advantage
Meeting with Kennedy to discuss voter 
registration.
D:Voter registration part of
legitimate focus rather than just 
another activity.
A:Intensified activities in voter 
registration.
Interstate Commerce Commission Order 
which banned segregation on facilities 
concerned with interstate travel.
R
R-T
R:Marvin Rich promoted to fund raiser 
position.
R:Demarcates initiation of trend of 
rapidly growing membership.
T'.New position created--Assistant to 
National Director. National Action 
Council replaced National Action 
Committee and National Council. Field 
secretaries became responsible for 
specific geographic areas.
A-R-D A:Focusing on discrimination in
employment and housing.
R:Marks end of concentration of resources 
in the South. Demarcates initiation of 
a trend of more blacks and especially 
working class blacks joining organization.
D:Beyond integration to the problems 
of the black poor.
Advantage Baltimore City Ordinance barring 
segregation in public accommodations 
following the Route 40 Freedom Ride.
Advantage Desegregation of substantial portion 
of Howard Johnson and Holiday Inn 
chains in North Carolina from 
Freedom Highways campaign.
December 1962 Advantage Preferential hiring agreement from 
Sealtest Dairies Co. following 
two month boycott.
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April 1963- 
July 1963
June 1963 
April 1964
April 1964
June 1964
June 1964- 
June 1965
August 1964 
September 1964 
October 1964
October 1964- 
January 1965
January 1965
R-A R:Increased number of people joining
CORE, and current members becoming 
more active. Financial support increased 
A:More direct action projects incorporating 
more radical techniques. Increase in 
profusion of direct action temporary, 
but increase in radicalization marks 
commencement of a trend. Radicalization 
included courting arrests, civil 
disobedience, and emphasis on ghetto 
improvement.
R R:Floyd McKissick appointed as National
Chairman.
A A:Marks recognition of a declining trend in
the importance and profusion 
of direct action projects.
R RrDecreasing contributions, combined with
history of over-spending, placed 
CORE in debt.
T T:Five Regional Action Councils created.
A-D A :Involvement in partisan politics
to oppose Goldwater's nomination as 
a presidential candidate.
D:Partisan politics as part of legitimate 
focus.
R R:Resignation of Norman Hill as program
director.
Advantage Benchmark for Gains in Voter Registration
in the South.
A-D A:Marks benchmark of an increasing
emphasis on community organizing 
D:Community Organizing--focusing on 
the felt needs of the community.
Freedom and equality rather than 
integration became central focus.
T-R T:Creation of Associate National
Director position.
R:George Wiley named to this new 
post.
R R:Response to rising debt:
Acquired loans and developed CORE 
Scholarship, Educational, and Defense 
Fund as sources of support for 
programs. Closed some offices; 
streamlined the staff and programs
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of those that remained open.
June 1965 
September 1965
J anuary 1966
March 1966 
June 1966
R
R
D-R
T:Formal declaration that members of the 
minority community "shall substantially 
constitute the leadership" of the chapters
AiVirtual end of voter registration 
in deference to previously noted 
increasing trend in community organizing.
R:Change in National Director from 
Farmer to Floyd McKissick.
R:Substantial loss of staff.
D:Endorsed Black Power rhetoric. Discarded 
commitment to nonviolence. Adopted 
an anti-war statement.
R:Many white supporters turned away from 
CORE.
June 1968 R-D-T R:Roy Innis replaced McKissick as National 
Director. Smaller staff and fewer 
chapters.
D:Black nationalism rather than civil 
rights. Formally excluded whites from 
becoming members.
T :Fewer staff positions arranged in more 
centralized configuration.
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Complete Chronology of SNCC's Restructurings and Successes 
With Specific Changes in Elements and Gains
Date of 
Re s true tur ing 
or Success
June 1961
Form of 
Re s true tur ing 
or Success
R-D
Specific Changes in Elements 
or Type of Success
R:Received a grant from the SCEF, 
an organization that was popularly 
viewed as communist-oriented. Hired 
Bob Zellner with this grant.
D:Assertion of the group's prerogative 
of Free Association.
June 1961
July 1961- 
August 1961
T-R
R-A
August 1961- D-T-A-R
September 1961
September 1961- R-D-A-T 
October 1961
T:Created field worker position.
R:Charles Sherrod hired to fill this 
position.
R:Bob Moses broke his ties with 
the SCLC and became a full-time 
SNCC worker.
A:Moses and two students began voter 
registration in Mississippi.
D:Formally shifted emphasis
to include both direct action and 
voter registration as part of 
SNCC's focus rather than as the 
responsibility of local college groups.
T:Two wings established--voter registration 
and direct action--with coordinators for 
each. Executive secretary position created 
to coordinate things from Atlanta.
A:Involving local Mississippi blacks in 
direct action rather than relying on 
college students to do the protesting.
R:Jim Forman selected as Executive Secretary,
R:Twelve students dropped out 
of college to become full-time 
SNCC workers.
D:Shifted sphere of influence from 
college campuses of entire South 
to the rural Deep South--Operation 
MOM (March on Mississippi).
A:Community organizing.
T:SNCC policy made by actions of 
field staff. Coordinating 
committee became more of a titular 
head.
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December 1961- 
June 1962
February 1962
April 1962
April 1962
June 1962- 
December 1962
October 1962 
December 1962
June 1963 
July 1963
September 1963- 
November 1963
T-R T:Created new positions: full-time
secretary, communications director, 
administrative assistant, and 
publicity and public relations.
R:Key people introduced to fill these 
posts (e.g., Julian Bond, Dotty 
Miller, Ruby Doris Robinson).
T T:Formalized emphasis on the
primacy of local leadership as 
seen in a proposal to the Voter 
Education Project.
R R:Benchmark for trend of increasingly
radical band of workers. New members 
likely to be involved in movement 
before joining and older members 
becoming radicalized by their experiences 
in the Deep South.
T T :Coordinating Committee re-oriented
to include representatives from each 
group rather than each state.
Executive Committee created to carry 
out policies between conferences.
D-R D:North designated as principal
area of fund raising.
R:Two white Northerners hired to 
direct these efforts.
A ArDirect aid project in form of
LeFlore County food drive.
R R:Benchmark of trend of increased
income from Northern fund raising 
operations.
R R:John Lewis elected as chairman.
Advantage Designates significant increase in
the number of black Mississippians who were 
registered to vote due to SNCC's efforts. 
Still only approximately 5% of eligible black 
voters were registered.
D-R-A D:"One man, one vote."
R:One hundred student volunteers 
from Stanford and Yale came to 
Mississippi to assist SNCC.
A:Freedom Vote.
February 1964 A A:Freedom Registration.
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April 1964
May 1964- 
June 1964
August 1964
September 1964 
September 1964
September 1964
October 1964
October 1964- 
J anuary 1965
February 1965 
March 1965
A-R A:Expanded Northern operations to
develop alliances and raise funds for 
proposed Summer Project.
R:Increased income.
R-A R:Shifted resources to Freedom Summer 
project areas of Mississippi. Influx 
of Northern college students as volunteers 
for the Summer.
A:Intensified existing projects and
activities. Began new activities such as 
Freedom Schools.
Acceptance: MFDP challenge at Democratic
Inclusion convention resulted in offer of
two seats with no voting rights and promise 
to bar representatives from discriminating 
states at next convention.
Advantage Marks increase in registered
voters on both Mississippi registrars' formal 
lists and in the unrecognized MFDP following 
the intensified efforts of Freedom Summer.
R R:Eighty of the Summer volunteers decided 
to remain in Mississippi and become full­
time SNCC workers rather than return to 
school.
A:First instance of SNCC-sponsored
international travel: eleven members toured 
Africa.
R
R-A
R:Benchmark for trend of eroding 
support from Northern liberals.
R:Staff not dependable or performing
their jobs well. "Freedom high" faction 
developed who valued personal freedom more 
highly than adherence to any organizational 
goals.
A:Closed a portion of the Freedom Schools and 
community centers established in the Summer 
due to this undependable staff.
T:Field staff demanded formal votes
for themselves within the organization.
They then voted themselves onto the 
coordinating committee. Secretariat created 
to make decisions between executive 
committee meetings.
A:Beginning of activities in Lowndes County.
June 1965 A A:Partisan politics in an urban area in
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December 1965 R
January 1966 D
January 1966 A
May 1966 R-T
May 1966 A
J une 1966 D
June 1966 R
July 1966 A-R
October 1966 R-D
November 1966 R-A
conjunction with Julian Bond's campaign for 
the Georgia House of Representatives.
R:Benchmark for declining trend
in contributions. SNCC no longer received 
significant contributions from institutional 
sources, and individual contributions were 
steadily decreasing.
D:Formal statement against U.S.
involvement in Vietnam. This is the first 
instance of expanding the group's legitimate 
scope beyond domestic racial issues.
A:Initiation of the Atlanta Project
(a group of urban organizers who were 
authorized by SNCC to build local community 
support for Julian Bond).
R:Stokely Carmichael elected chairman after 
a contested re-election of John Lewis.
T:Ten-member committe created to replace the 
executive committee. Declaration that whites 
should work in the white community and 
blacks in the black community.
A:Beginning of a series of trips to 
foreign countries.
D :Black Power.
R:Resignation of John Lewis.
A:Many projects not being carried
out because staff members not doing their 
jobs .
R:Fired some of the ineffective staff and 
closed some offices.
R:Benchmark for a discernible shifting
of staff from rural projects to urban areas.
D:Emphasis on these urban areas as the 
legitimate focus of SNCC's activities.
R:A11 Lowndes County staff, except
Rap Brown, left their posts after the 
November election.
A:End of previously active Lowndes County 
project. Signifies virtual end of voter 
registration.
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December 1966- D-R
Hay 1967
February 1967 R
May 1967 R-D-T
July 1967 R
June 1968 R-T
July 1968 R
December 1968 R
June 1969 D-R-T
D:Formal declaration of an 
all-black organization.
R:Loss of white staff. This was seen most 
distinctly in SNCC’s refusal to officially 
support Bob and Dotty Zellner's work in 
New Orleans.
R:Fired Atlanta Project staff.
R:Rap Brown elected to replace 
Carmichael as chairman.
D:Expanded legitimate focus to international 
arena with declaration of the group as a 
"human rights organization."
T :Established an international affairs 
commission.
R:Loss of most remaining
contributions from white supporters 
following publication of a pro-Palestinian 
article by a SNCC member.
R:Rap Brown's series of arrests
made it impossible for him to be an 
effective chairman.
T:Replaced the position of chairman with 
nine deputy chairmen.
R:Carmichael expelled.
R:Cleveland Sellers and Willie Ricks 
fired.
D:Redefined focus as a paramilitary 
group.
R:Resignation of Jim Foreman.
T:Rap Brown in position of titular leader, 
but control of the organization actually 
was in the hands of the newly created 
Revolutionary Political Council.
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